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Each year family courts incarcerate thousands of Americans for nonpayment 
of child support. The vast majority of these parents are not accorded criminal pro-
cedure protections because courts have characterized routine child support enforce-
ment as a “civil” matter. The United States Supreme Court has endorsed this ap-
proach. In Turner v Rogers, the Court began from a premise it regarded as both 
legally significant and unquestionably true: that child support proceedings are civil. 
† Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. Support from the 
Stanford Center for Law and History and especially faculty director Amalia Kessler was 
invaluable as I completed this Article. For helpful comments and conversations, I thank 
Gregory Ablavsky, Kerry Abrams, Monique Abrishami, Susan Appleton, Ralph Richard 
Banks, Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Katie Cole, Beth Colgan, Nancy F. Cott, Samuel Ennis, 
George Fisher, Barbara Fried, Lawrence Friedman, Robert W. Gordon, Howard Kaufman, 
Zachary D. Kaufman, Adriaan Lanni, Jessica Lowe, Kenneth W. Mack, Bernadette 
Meyler, Melissa Murray, Kelly Phipps, Eli Russell, Christopher Schmidt, Sarah Seo, 
David Sklansky, Ji Seon Song, Norman Spaulding, Emily Stolzenberg, Mark Storslee, 
Charles Tyler, Lael Weinberger, Robert Weisberg, John Wertheimer, and participants in 
the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop, the Stanford Legal Studies Workshop, and 
the Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference. Librarians at Harvard University and 
Stanford Law School and archivists at the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript 
Library provided excellent assistance. Research for this Article was generously supported 
by the American Historical Association’s Albert J. Beveridge Grant; the American Society 
for Legal History’s William Nelson Cromwell Foundation Fellowship; Harvard’s Center 
for American Political Studies Dissertation Fellowship and Seed Grant; and Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government’s History and Public Policy Initiative in the Ash Center 
for Democratic Governance. 
1242 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1241 
 
On that basis, the Court determined that an indigent father facing a year in jail was 
not entitled to a public defender. The Court’s analysis reflects a broader and wide-
spread assumption that family law is a civil field. Recent scholarship has chal-
lenged that understanding by examining how criminal law and family law work in 
tandem to police certain conduct. This Article goes further by demonstrating that 
modern support duties and the family courts that enforce them evolved from crimi-
nal laws and courts. 
Relying on extensive historical research, this Article argues that child support 
enforcement is criminal law in a civil guise. Family nonsupport was criminalized 
around the turn of the twentieth century to permit extradition of offenders. Criminal 
court judges then tasked newly minted probation officers with reconciling, investi-
gating, and monitoring families—novel state interventions in domestic life. Proba-
tion officers, in turn, staffed and promoted specialized criminal nonsupport courts 
(initially called “domestic relations courts” and later “family courts”) that some cities 
opened to handle these prosecutions in the 1910s. Beginning in the 1930s, costs and 
stigma associated with criminal law led legislators to strategically relabel family 
courts and support enforcement as “civil,” even while retaining procedures, person-
nel, and powers drawn from the criminal context. Observers found the ongoing use 
of criminal-derived oversight methods unobjectionable; the decades in which sup-
port law was largely criminal law shifted norms about acceptable and desirable 
state involvement in family relationships. As the number of civil “child support” 
suits surpassed nonsupport prosecutions (which all states retained) and probation 
officers disappeared from family litigation, the criminal heritage and continued 
criminal-law reinforcement of family courts and support laws were obscured. 
The calculated and incomplete conversion of family support enforcement from 
criminal to civil undercuts the supposedly distinct purposes, procedures, and penal-
ties associated with the civil and criminal categories. Building on scholarship that 
critiques the Supreme Court’s treatment of statutory schemes that blur the civil-
criminal divide, the Article draws from child support history to condemn the Court’s 
strong deference to legislative labels and to propose greater consideration of enforce-
ment methods. If the Court were persuaded to recognize child support incarceration 
as a criminal sanction, then states would face a difficult choice. They could either 
allocate the resources needed for constitutionally mandated criminal procedure pro-
tections or decriminalize the enforcement machinery—ideally through elimination 
of most child support incarceration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2011 case of Turner v Rogers, the United States  
Supreme Court held that a father jailed for a year by a family 
court judge for nonpayment of child support was not entitled to a 
public defender.1 The defendant in that case, Michael Turner, was 
one of the millions of Americans who are party to a child support 
order. Today these parents collectively owe more than $30 billion 
annually.2 Over $100 billion in child support payments is over-
due, and thousands of child support debtors are in jail.3 
Most child support cases are heard in specialized domestic 
relations or family courts that also have jurisdiction over other 
family litigation, such as divorce and child custody.4 Each year 
there are more than five million domestic relations suits, compris-
ing over 10 percent of state court dockets.5 Family-related litiga-
tion is thus many Americans’ most direct and important contact 
with the legal system.6 Scholars and practitioners have found 
 
 1 Turner v Rogers, 564 US 431, 435 (2011). 
 2 Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2013 *11 
(United States Department of Commerce, Jan 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/28UD-59YV. 
 3 Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: 
The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 95, 106–07, 116–17 (2008). 
 4 On variations in modern family court jurisdiction, see Barbara A. Babb, Reevalu-
ating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of America’s Family Justice Systems, 46 
Fam Ct Rev 230, 232–33 (2008). 
 5 Richard Y. Schauffler, et al, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Overview of 
2015 State Court Caseloads *3, 10 (National Center for State Courts, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/34A6-M2AC (statistic excludes traffic cases). Around 30 percent of domes-
tic relations matters are support suits or closely related paternity cases. Id at *10. 
 6 Countless other families make decisions without state intervention yet subject to 
the norms established through litigated cases; in the language of a classic law review ar-
ticle, people who pursue private agreements “bargain in the shadow of the law.” Robert H. 
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 Yale L J 950, 968 (1979). 
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that, despite family courts’ importance, these tribunals suffer 
from poor resources, limited access to counsel, low-status judges, 
and inadequate procedures.7 
In Turner, the justices began from the premise that they were 
evaluating the procedural protections warranted in a civil pro-
ceeding. The Court unquestioningly accepted that Turner’s 
minutes-long appearance before a South Carolina family court 
was a “civil contempt hearing.”8 On that basis, the justices rea-
soned that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply.9 
The majority instead applied a civil balancing test and concluded 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired only “alternative procedural safeguards.”10 The dissenters 
likewise found no Due Process right to counsel. Two dissenters 
went further, critiquing the majority’s opinion for insufficiently 
considering “the interests of the child and custodial parent, who 
is usually the child’s mother.”11 Referring to obstacles to collecting 
support from “deadbeat dads,” they credited states’ claim that 
civil contempt imprisonment is a “highly effective tool for collect-
ing child support when nothing else works.”12 
Turner has provided rich fodder for a range of legal commen-
tary that also assumes that incarceration for child support non-
payment is civil in nature. The case has become a leading example 
of the need for improved access to justice and perhaps a civil  
Gideon.13 It also serves as a centerpiece in family law literature 
 
 7 Jane C. Murphy and Jana B. Singer, Divorced from Reality: Rethinking Family 
Dispute Resolution 102 (NYU 2015) (noting that a majority of family litigants have no 
access to counsel); Deborah Chase and Peggy Fulton Hora, The Best Seat in the House: 
The Court Assignment and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 Fam Ct Rev 209, 212–13 (2009) (sum-
marizing criticism of family courts). 
 8 Turner, 564 US at 436, 438. 
 9 Id at 441–42. 
 10 Id at 444–45, 448, citing Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976) and Lassiter 
v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 27–31 (1981). 
 11 Turner, 564 US at 458 (Thomas dissenting). 
 12 Id at 459–60 (quotation marks omitted). 
 13 See generally Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963). For a particularly helpful 
treatment that situates Turner in a longer history of related advocacy, see Kelly Terry, 
The Movement for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Turner v. Rogers (2011), in Ezra 
Rosser and Marie Failinger, eds, The Poverty Law Canon 256–73 (2016). See also, for ex-
ample, Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons 
from Domestic and International Law, 122 Yale L J 2260, 2268–72 (2013) (“[T]he Turner 
Court’s references to equality considerations reflect the Court’s intuitive understanding 
that inequality in access to the courts might distort the checks and balances underlying 
our democratic system.”); Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor”, 84 U Chi L Rev 1149, 
1195–96 & n 228 (2017). Civil procedure casebooks include Turner in discussing access to 
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that critiques the harmful consequences of child support enforce-
ment on poor and minority fathers and their families. 14 More 
broadly, child support enforcement features in discussions of the 
seeming return of debtors’ prison and mass incarceration.15 
This Article challenges the widespread understanding of 
child support laws as civil, an intervention with profound conse-
quences for the treatment of support cases and analysis of the 
civil-criminal divide. Extensive archival research reveals that the 
civil label obscures a system born in and backed by criminal law. 
Today’s child support obligations are enforced in specialized fam-
ily courts that retain procedures developed when these tribunals 
primarily oversaw criminal nonsupport cases. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, lawmakers 
criminalized family nonsupport, applied probation supervision to 
offenders, and segregated nonsupport cases in specialized domes-
tic relations courts. Together these developments allowed the 
state to intervene more directly and coercively in securing family 
financial support than had previously been possible. Criminal en-
forcement also brought downsides including costs and stigma that 
some reformers wished to reduce. Beginning in the 1930s, law-
makers strategically rebranded criminal nonsupport prosecu-
tions and the courts that heard them as “civil.” At the same time, 
they preserved essential elements—state employee monitoring 
and enforcement, as well as incarceration (technically via civil 
contempt)—cultivated in the criminal context. States also re-
tained criminal law for deterrence and to use in the most egre-
gious cases. This incomplete shift from criminal to civil set the 
foundation for today’s purportedly civil approach to support  
 
justice. See, for example, Barbara Allen Babcock, Toni M. Massaro, and Norman W. 
Spaulding, Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems 91–103 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed 2017). 
 14 See, for example, Tonya L. Brito, Fathers behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Pol-
icy toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J Gender Race & Just 
617, 668–69 (2012); Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 BU L Rev 897, 911–13 (2013). 
These articles contribute to a rich and growing literature on law and fatherhood. See generally, 
for example, Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family 
Inequalities, 102 Va L Rev 79 (2016); Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and 
Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 Yale L J 2292 (2016). 
 15 See, for example, Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Con-
temporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 Seattle U L Rev 927, 933–35 (2016) 
(explaining disproportionate targeting of racial minorities for enforcement of failure to 
pay); Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 Georgetown J Poverty L & 
Pol 127, 142–46 (2011). 
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enforcement. With its decision in Turner, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed this obfuscation, allowing the state’s label to limit proce-
dural protections. 
In unearthing the criminal origins of family courts and sup-
port laws, this Article contributes to historical and modern un-
derstandings of family law. While two historians have contrib-
uted perceptive work on the passage and enforcement of criminal 
nonsupport statutes and the related creation of specialized do-
mestic relations courts from the 1890s into the 1930s, these ac-
counts are temporally and geographically limited and have not 
been incorporated into family law scholarship.16 Law review arti-
cles cover child support in the nineteenth century and then skip 
to the mid-twentieth, omitting the critical period in which non-
payment often prompted criminal prosecution.17 Some work con-
demns early domestic relations courts based on the erroneous 
claim that these tribunals decriminalized domestic violence.18 Le-
gal scholars interested in family courts for their procedural inno-
vations have contributed insightful accounts, yet this work does 
 
 16 Anna R. Igra, Wives without Husbands: Marriage, Desertion, & Welfare in New 
York, 1900-1935 (UNC 2007); Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Pro-
gressive Era Chicago 128–71 (Cambridge 2003); Anna R. Igra, Likely to Become a Public 
Charge: Deserted Women and the Family Law of the Poor in New York City, 1910–1936, 11 
J Women Hist 59 (2000); Michael Willrich, Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in 
Modern America, 87 J Am Hist 460 (2000). For an account of midcentury family court 
development, see J. Herbie DiFonzo, Beneath the Fault Line: The Popular and Legal Cul-
ture of Divorce in Twentieth-Century America 122 (UVA 1997) (casting family courts as an 
unsuccessful stop on the road to no-fault divorce). See also Theodore Fadlo Boushy, The 
Historical Development of the Domestic Relations Court (unpublished PhD dissertation, 
The University of Oklahoma, 1950) (on file with author). Though many scholars cite  
Willrich’s City of Courts for general histories of court reform and specialization, Westlaw 
shows only nine articles citing this book or Home Slackers for discussion of nonsupport 
cases, with eight of these appearing in the Law and History Review or Law & Social In-
quiry. (The only exception is Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 
Yale J L & Humanities 189, 246 n 210 (2011).) Of the eight history articles, two are the 
only legal scholarship to cite Igra. 
 17 A commonly cited piece on child support history is Drew D. Hansen, Note, The 
American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early American 
Child Support Law, 108 Yale L J 1123 (1999), building on Donna Schuele, Origins and 
Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J Fam L 807 (1988). While Hansen’s 
Note offers some helpful points, the author’s analysis is at times misleading because of the 
focus on divorced fathers, a small subset of the men held responsible for family support in 
this period. Hansen, Note, 108 Yale L J at 1125 n 14. Moreover, the attention to child 
support is somewhat anachronistic because more children were supported through undif-
ferentiated awards that also included their mothers. 
 18 See, for example, Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Do-
mestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 Vand L Rev 1015, 1040 (2014) (relying on popular 
accounts). 
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not seek to intervene in understandings of family law.19 These dis-
connects leave the widespread impression that modern family 
courts belong under the civil umbrella.20 Indeed, it is this under-
standing of family courts as civil that underlies one of the most 
contentious debates on their jurisdiction today—whether it is ap-
propriate to place domestic violence cases within (implicitly civil) 
family courts.21  
By bringing together and greatly supplementing existing his-
torical and legal treatments of child support and family courts, 
this account embraces and extends scholars’ capacious conception 
of “family law.” The family law canon, leaders in the field have 
persuasively argued, should include topics as wide-ranging as im-
migration, welfare, and zoning, to name just a few.22 Though one 
facet of this broadening effort has been to explore how family law 
and criminal law have worked in tandem to police certain family-
related conduct (especially sexual relations and domestic vio-
lence), experts continue to decry an underappreciation of how 
 
 19 Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J Disp Res 91, 100–03 
(2011) (describing family court history in the development of alternative dispute resolu-
tion); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 
22 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 473, 478–79, 488–94 (2015) (using family court as exam-
ple of a “quintessential poor people’s court” and examining the negative implications of 
“informality and interventionism”). See also Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 
Fam Ct Rev 258, 266–68 (2008) (using family court history to question promise of modern 
problem-solving courts). 
 20 See, for example, David W. Neubauer and Henry F. Fradella, America’s Courts 
and the Criminal Justice System 97 (Wadsworth 10th ed 2011) (“[D]omestic relations cases 
constitute the fastest-growing part of the civil caseload.”); Lawrence Baum, American 
Courts: Process and Policy 43 (Houghton Mifflin 6th ed 2008) (in table of courts, including 
“Domestic (civil)”).  
 21 Many discussants argue that domestic violence belongs in family courts so judges 
can treat each family holistically, while others insist that these matters should be heard 
with other assault charges in criminal courts for legal, practical, and symbolic reasons. 
Some jurisdictions have experimented with courts that hear only domestic violence cases. 
For thoughtful voices in these discussions, see generally Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary 
Rules of Engagement in the War against Domestic Violence, 90 NYU L Rev 397 (2015); Adi 
Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 Nw U L Rev 1205 (2017); and Elizabeth L.  
MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and Court Plural-
ism, 20 Tex J Women & L 95 (2011). 
 22 See generally Kerry Abrams, Book Review, Family History: Inside and Out, 111 
Mich L Rev 1001 (2013); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan L Rev 825 
(2004); Janet Halley, 23 Yale J L & Humanities 189 (cited in note 16); Janet Halley and 
Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contem-
porary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 Am J Comp L 753 (2010). 
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these areas of law interrelate.23 Criminal regulation of marital be-
haviors is still perceived as the exception historically24 and as a 
recent, hard-fought change.25 This Article joins scholarship stud-
ying the nexus between family law and criminal law and breaks 
new ground by showing that criminal law and family law have 
not merely acted together—some criminal laws and courts became 
family laws and courts. 
That criminal law targeted family support obligations also 
challenges a broader conventional wisdom about “family pri-
vacy.”26 Family law casebooks and scholarship routinely cite a 
1953 Nebraska civil case for the proposition that marital finances 
have been impervious to state regulation because of judicial reti-
cence to meddle in the affairs of intact families.27 When scholars 
acknowledge court regulation of family finances, they often em-
phasize a “dual system” in which poor families are subject to 
 
 23 Professor Melissa Murray writes that family law and criminal law “are strange 
bedfellows whose interaction is frequently overlooked.” Murray’s insightful intervention 
is to examine how criminal law worked “alongside” and “in tandem” with family law to 
regulate “the normative content of intimate life.” Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: 
Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 Iowa L Rev 
1253, 1255, 1257, 1272 (2009). See also Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 
Colum L Rev 1, 23–37 (2012) (arguing that marriage operated as a punishment when 
criminal law fell short in seduction suits). Other scholarship discussing the criminal reg-
ulation of intimate life includes Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 Va L Rev 1 (1998) 
and Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal L 
Rev 1373 (2000). For a recent contribution focused on parent-child relationships, see gen-
erally Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime, 69 Ala L Rev 169 
(2017) (challenging limited nexus that scholars have recognized between family law and 
criminal law by studying corporal punishment and incest laws). Related scholarship stud-
ies how family relationships burden or benefit defendants in the criminal justice system—
see generally, for example, Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, and Ethan J. Leib, Privilege 
or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties (Oxford 2009)—and the neg-
ative consequences of criminal law on families—see generally, for example, Andrea L. 
Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 Ga St U L Rev 285 (2017). 
 24 Murray, 94 Iowa L Rev at 1258–64 (cited in note 23) (identifying and critiquing 
this perception). 
 25 For a challenge to the common claim that criminal law did not address spousal 
domestic violence until the 1960s, see generally Elizabeth Katz, Judicial Patriarchy and 
Domestic Violence: A Challenge to the Conventional Family Privacy Narrative, 21 Wm & 
Mary J Women & L 379 (2015). 
 26 This aspect of the Article contributes to Halley’s critique of Family Law Exceptional-
ism by recovering the “economic family.” Previous contributions to this discussion have not 
considered criminal law. See Halley and Rittich, 58 Am J Comp L at 758 (cited in note 22). 
 27 The case is McGuire v McGuire, 59 NW2d 336 (Neb 1953). For a representative 
example of its use, see Brian Bix, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Family Law 16–
18 (Oxford 2013). But see Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 
18 U Mich J L Ref 835, 842 (1985) (challenging “the basic coherence of the concepts inter-
vention and nonintervention . . . because the state constantly defines and redefines the 
family”). 
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harsher intrusions.28 This Article’s examination of criminal sup-
port enforcement—applied to families with varied degrees of to-
getherness and at a range of income levels—disrupts this neat 
binary as well as the overall notion of family privacy.29 
Beyond the family law context, criminal law’s formative role 
in modern family support laws and courts contributes to discus-
sion about the blurring of the civil-criminal divide. Although 
criminal law (in which the state brings a prosecution to protect 
the public and rehabilitate/punish a wrongdoer) and civil law 
(which typically involves a private party initiating suit to seek 
redress of a harm) are generally discussed and taught as discrete 
subjects, scholars have identified myriad ways in which the line 
is sometimes unclear because of government involvement or 
seemingly extreme consequences in matters labeled “civil.” This 
scholarship often focuses on US Supreme Court cases, empha-
sizes changes in recent decades (sometimes suggesting this is a 
contemporary phenomenon), and applies philosophical or other 
theoretical lenses.30 
This Article enriches civil-criminal discussions by providing 
a distinct and concrete example for consideration: state legisla-
tures’ deliberate and sustained crafting of a criminal-civil hybrid. 
The intermingled public and private goals of family support en-
forcement afforded lawmakers the flexibility to draw their pre-
ferred elements from civil and criminal law. They could cite the 
need to reduce reliance on charity and welfare, reinforce desirable 
(and in practice gendered) parental and marital behaviors, and 
 
 28 The classic account is Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: 
Its Origin, Development, and Present Status: Part I, 16 Stan L Rev 257 (1964). 
 29 While acknowledging that poor families were disproportionately subject to crimi-
nal enforcement of support duties, this Article pushes back against “dual system” descrip-
tions that overlook the state’s coercive power over families not on welfare. In doing so, it 
joins the helpful analyses offered by Dinner, 102 Va L Rev at 82–83 (cited in note 14); 
Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash between Custody and 
Child Support, 42 Ind L Rev 611, 618–21 (2009); and Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support 
Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of 
the State, 42 Wake Forest L Rev 1029, 1035–44 (2007). See also June Carbone and Naomi 
Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 Mich St L Rev 1185. 
 30 Commonly cited articles include John C. Coffee Jr, Paradigms Lost: The Blurring 
of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L J 
1875 (1992); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buff Crim L Rev 
679 (1999); David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law without Leaving 
Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 
Georgetown L J 683 (2006); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment The-
ory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Georgetown L J 775 (1997). 
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bolster family relationships—all of which included public and pri-
vate elements. Through decades of pragmatic and creative blend-
ing, lawmakers fashioned a criminal-style law in a civil guise, an 
exercise that undercuts assumptions about the supposedly  
distinct purposes, procedures, and penalties in civil and  
criminal law. 
The Article proceeds chronologically, using newspaper arti-
cles, court reports, conference proceedings, and cases to recover 
the criminal origins of family courts and the financial obligations 
they impose. Because the dates, speed, and comprehensiveness of 
reform varied by location, this Article focuses on nationwide de-
velopments and influential trendsetters, acknowledging variation 
when doing so adds relevant nuance. The first Part explains that 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, men’s in-
creasing mobility prompted charity leaders to advocate for the 
criminalization of family support duties in order to gain access to 
extradition. These reformers favored misdemeanors over felonies, 
initiating a century-long effort to categorize family support duties 
in whatever manner promised the most advantageous combina-
tion of high coercion and reach with low process and cost. Once 
nonsupport was criminalized, reformers faced the question of how 
to translate a conviction into financial support for dependents. 
Here they turned to newly appointed probation officers to inves-
tigate, rehabilitate, and oversee offenders.31 
To facilitate the enforcement of criminal nonsupport laws, 
Part II continues, many large cities opened specialized “domestic 
relations courts” beginning in the 1910s. These courts depended 
on probation officers, who in turn pushed their nascent organiza-
tions, most notably the National Probation Association (NPA), to 
advocate for the spread and expansion of the courts. In this sym-
biotic relationship, the success of probation as a profession was 
tied to the scope and resources of the domestic relations courts, 
while the effectiveness of the courts and power of the judges 
turned on the availability and abilities of probation officers. Pro-
bation-backed, criminal domestic relations courts introduced a 
greater level of state intervention in family behavior, and espe-
cially family finances, than had previously been possible.32 
 
 31 See Part I. 
 32 See Part II. The canonical book on probation’s early years is inattentive to the 
categories of adult cases that received probation treatment and therefore misses the cru-
cial role family courts played in employing probation officers and validating probation’s 
methods. David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives 
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Part III explores how perceived drawbacks to criminal law 
inspired innovative approaches from the 1930s through 1950s. 
New York took the lead by creating a “civil” nonsupport offense 
that retained criminal enforcement mechanisms: probationary 
oversight and incarceration. So that these civil statutes could 
reach across state lines, all states passed reciprocal enforcement 
laws by the mid-1950s. Under the new civil regime, the state used 
criminal-style powers and provided multifaceted oversight to en-
sure compliance, a situation that most observers found unre-
markable after becoming accustomed to deep court involvement 
in the criminal context. The half century in which family support 
law was largely criminal law had shifted societal norms regarding 
acceptable intervention of the state in family relationships. Alt-
hough all states retained criminal statutes for deterrence and to 
use in the most condemnable cases, the criminal-derived civil law 
was so efficient that criminal prosecutions were rarely  
necessary.33 
Because of their shifting caseload, family courts soon ap-
peared to be civil tribunals. Further disconnecting family courts 
from their criminal origins, inadequate funding and expanding 
dockets caused the role of probation officer to gradually dissolve 
into a bureaucratic and impersonal system that focused solely on 
overseeing support payments, in contrast to the supposedly reha-
bilitative oversight of earlier years. The civil facade crystallized 
just before the Warren Court initiated the criminal procedure rev-
olution, which may explain why family courts missed the scrutiny 
the Court applied to their cousin institution, juvenile courts.34 De-
spite changes in the following decades—most importantly the 
continued spread and jurisdictional diversification of family 
 
in Progressive America (HarperCollins 1980) (arguing that cities absorbed the costs of pro-
bation, despite recognition of the method’s shortcomings, because it facilitated plea bar-
gaining). For perceptive scholarship that discusses the importance and operation of mod-
ern probation and relies on Rothman’s account for historical background, see Philip 
Goodman, Joshua Page, and Michelle Phelps, Breaking the Pendulum: The Long Struggle 
over Criminal Justice 55–56 (Oxford 2017); Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: 
Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 Georgetown L J 291, 328–29 (2016); 
Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation: Toward a More Robust Theory of State Variation in 
Punishment, 19 Punishment & Soc 53, 67 (2017). 
 33 See Parts III.A–B. 
 34 In In re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967), the Supreme Court looked to history and the over-
all context of juvenile courts when it found that “civil” juvenile delinquency proceedings 
that can lead to incarceration do qualify for state-appointed legal counsel. The Turner 
majority distinguished Gault with minimal explanation, Turner, 564 US at 443, which is 
especially striking because of the interrelated development of juvenile and family courts. 
See Part II. 
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courts, a narrowed focus on child rather than family support, a 
gradual willingness to treat “illegitimate” children like those born 
to married spouses, and the growing involvement of the federal 
government—the blended criminal-civil approach remains in 
place.35 
By connecting criminal domestic relations courts and non-
support prosecutions to modern family courts and child support 
proceedings, this Article shows that a substantial component of 
family law has long been criminal law. Part IV begins with an 
overview of why the ongoing criminal-style enforcement of child 
support orders is concerning for practical and principled reasons. 
Political efforts and Turner have proven inadequate to prompt 
meaningful change, so the Article suggests that asking the Court 
to recognize the criminal nature of child support incarceration 
could forge a new path. It is unclear how the Court would respond 
to this argument. Scholars agree that the Court’s treatment of 
statutory schemes that blur the civil-criminal divide is flawed. 
Lessons from the child support account could help improve the 
Court’s civil-criminal test by counseling against deferring to state 
labels and by demonstrating the relevance of enforcement ma-
chinery to the analysis. The labeling of child support incarcera-
tion as a criminal sanction would force states to make a difficult 
choice. They could either allocate the resources needed for crimi-
nal procedure protections or (more productively) truly decriminal-
ize child support enforcement by eliminating the routine use of 
incarceration.36 
I.  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MEN’S FAMILY SUPPORT DUTIES 
(1895–1920S) 
This Part explains why charity leaders led an effort to crimi-
nalize men’s family support duties beginning in the late nine-
teenth century. Though moral condemnation and a desire for 
harsher punishment were factors,37 this Part argues that the pri-
mary motivation for criminalization was the need for extradition 
in order to reach delinquent breadwinners across state lines. 
While reformers agreed that family nonsupport should be criminal-
ized, they debated whether the offense should be a misdemeanor or 
 
 35 See Part III.C and Part IV.A. 
 36 See Part IV. 
 37 Willrich, City of Courts at 147–49 (cited in note 16); Willrich, 87 J Am Hist at 464, 
473 (cited in note 16). 
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a felony, ultimately favoring the former for strategic reasons. After 
criminalization, courts turned to newly appointed probation offic-
ers to supervise nonsupporters and ensure that the men provided 
weekly payments to their dependents. Although the criminaliza-
tion of family support duties appeared problematic to some de-
fendants and judges, nearly every objection to the scheme failed. 
The blended public-private purpose of family support enforce-
ment seemingly justified the use of states’ criminal powers. 
A. Shortcomings of Civil and Poor Law Support Enforcement 
Prior to the passage of criminal nonsupport laws, a wife could 
obtain financial support from her husband for herself and their 
children through three legal approaches: the doctrine of neces-
saries, a legal separation, and poor law.38 Derived from a blend of 
common law, state statutes, and equity, these options provided 
remedies to many dependents. Judges and legislators continually 
revised these laws to better fit evolving social and economic  
circumstances.39 Nevertheless, by the late nineteenth century, all 
three methods failed to secure support from the growing group of 
men whose only assets were weekly wages and who were increas-
ingly mobile due to improvements in transportation.40 
The legal starting point for the regulation of marital obliga-
tions was the common law doctrine of coverture, under which a 
 
 38 Because most family support litigation in this period involved spouses and marital 
children, this account does not directly consider the “bastardy” law that governed support of 
“illegitimate” children in some states. It is possible the quasi-criminal status of bastardy laws 
provided comforting precedent to legal reformers who sought a quasi-criminal or fully crim-
inal statute to address the arguably analogous nonsupport of marital children, but reformers 
did not openly draw this connection and some judges dismissed such comparisons. See, for 
example, State v Schweitzer, 18 A 787, 787–89 (Conn 1889) (bastardy’s status as noncriminal 
did not indicate nonsupport was noncriminal). For representative discussion of bastardy’s 
quasi-criminal status, see People v Phalen, 13 NW 830, 831 (Mich 1882) (Bastardy proceed-
ings “cannot be classed as strictly criminal or civil in their nature but partake somewhat of 
the elements of both. They are quasi criminal in so far as the aim is to protect the public.”) 
(emphasis in original). For an overview of bastardy laws, see Chester Vernier, 4 American 
Family Laws: A Comparative Study of the Family Law of the Forty-Eight American States, 
Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii (to Jan. 1, 1935) 206–19 (Stanford 1936). As 
late as 1940, fewer than 4 percent of births were to unwed mothers. Stephanie J. Ventura 
and Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1949–99 (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Oct 18, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/B24V-2RD3. 
Legal treatment of children born out of wedlock drew attention in later decades. See, for 
example, Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform 
Act on Legitimacy, 44 Tex L Rev 829, 848–54 (1966). 
 39 The most comprehensive overview is L. Neville Brown, Family Maintenance and 
Its Enforcement in the United States, 13 Intl & Comp L Q 139 (1964). 
 40 See Parts I.A–B. 
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husband and wife were one legal person. Coverture imposed 
rights and duties on both members of a couple. The husband, as 
head of the household, was required to support his family. The 
wife, in turn, pledged to obey her husband and serve him with her 
labor.41 The husband had the right to choose the family’s domicile 
and, because spouses were expected to live together, this meant 
the wife had to follow her husband to a new home unless his 
wrongful conduct justified her in living apart.42 
Because coverture typically did not allow a wife to contract or 
own property, the traditional way a married woman could make 
purchases was pursuant to the “doctrine of necessaries.” Under a 
simple application of the doctrine, a wife bought items on credit 
from a merchant, who then recovered the cost from her husband.43 
“Necessaries” included food, clothing, housing, and household 
items “such as would be proper for the station, tastes, standing, 
and financial ability of the husband and wife.”44 The necessaries 
doctrine benefitted children indirectly, as a mother’s necessaries 
purchases could include items for the couple’s children.45 Whether 
and to what extent a parent could be held liable for necessaries 
purchased directly by or for a child was a more difficult question, 
but judges developed case law that generally held a father liable.46 
While a commonplace approach, not all women and children 
benefitted from the necessaries doctrine because it typically re-
quired a merchant to trust that a man would pay his dependents’ 
bills. If a husband refused to pay, the merchant sued him to re-
cover. At trial, the merchant bore the risk that a judge or jury 
would conclude that the items were not actually necessary or that 
 
 41 Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 11–13  
(Harvard 2000). 
 42 James Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 35 at 64–65, § 37 
at 67 (Little, Brown 1895). 
 43 Scholars have argued that the doctrine of necessaries was ineffectual. While my 
own research challenges this literature, for purposes of this Article, it suffices to observe 
that the doctrine did not help a growing subset of dependents. See, for example, Hendrik 
Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History 156–60 (Harvard 2000). 
 44 W.C. Rodgers, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 221 at 183 (TH Flood 
& Co 1899); Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 61 at 99  
(cited in note 42). 
 45 Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 71 at 118  
(cited in note 42). 
 46 See, for example, Yarborough v Yarborough, 290 US 202, 207–08 (1933). See also 
W.R. Vance, The Parent’s Liability for Necessaries Furnished His Minor Child, 6 Va L Reg 
585, 592–96 (1901) (comparing English and American cases); Case Note, Parent and 
Child—Support of Child—Liability of Father—Rogers v. Rogers, 24 Yale L J 170 (1914). 
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the wife was not eligible to purchase on the husband’s credit be-
cause they lived apart for reasons that were her fault.47 Thus, alt-
hough courts and legislatures modified aspects of the doctrine to 
enhance its availability and usefulness, this approach did not uni-
formly secure access to support.48 The doctrine provided the great-
est benefit to a woman whose husband was a longstanding com-
munity member with a good reputation. It was relatively 
ineffective for a destitute member of a mobile, immigrant, or poor 
family. 
Another option that was available to a wife lacking financial 
support was to pursue a legal separation that could require her 
husband to provide periodic or one-time payments. 49  This ap-
proach included separate maintenance orders entered by a court, 
privately negotiated separation agreements, and divorce with al-
imony.50 Awarded sums often included support for children, ex-
plicitly or implicitly.51 Still, much like the doctrine of necessaries, 
a separation was most helpful to a certain type of wife: one who 
 
 47 Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 66 at 108–10  
(cited in note 42). 
 48 Id at § 72 at 118–19. 
 49 A husband could be liable for his wife’s attorney’s fees and court costs by court 
order or pursuant to the doctrine of necessaries, though practicalities and legal complexi-
ties meant recovery was not assured. See Case Note, Divorce—Counsel Fees—Allowance 
to Wife—Dean v. Dean, 15 Yale L J 376 (1906); Husband and Wife—Attorney’s Fees—Hus-
band’s Liability—Hendrick v. Silver, 19 Yale L J 55 (1909). 
 50 Separate maintenance was initially provided under courts’ equity power and was 
later supplemented by statutes. Most states allowed wives to obtain maintenance orders, 
providing regular payments, by the first decade of the twentieth century. See, for example, 
Cureton v Cureton, 96 SW 608 (Tenn 1906); Hagert v Hagert, 133 NW 1035 (ND 1911). 
Alternatively, couples could privately execute separation agreements. While the enforce-
ability of such contracts was shaky through the mid-1800s, most courts upheld their va-
lidity by the end of the century so long as they seemed fair and were executed when a 
couple had already separated or was separating imminently. Schouler, A Treatise on the 
Law of Domestic Relations § 215 at 324, § 217 at 328–29 (cited in note 42). States also 
passed statutes permitting divorce and alimony upon a finding of fault against one party, 
with common permissible bases including adultery, cruelty, and desertion. Id at § 220 at 
336–40. 
 51 Frederic J. Stimson, American Statute Law § 6245 at 698, § 6351 at 710 (Charles 
C. Soule 1886). See also generally Support of Children in Absence of Provision Therefor in 
Decree Awarding Custody to Divorced Wife, 17 Yale L J 284 (1908) (finding a sharp conflict 
in authority regarding the liability of a father for support of his children in the absence of 
a decree, but noting “trend of the decisions” in favor of imposing liability). 
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could reasonably expect her husband’s compliance with a pri-
vately negotiated agreement or court order because he had assets, 
a permanent domicile, and a reputation to maintain.52 
If a man refused to comply with a support order, the cost, de-
lay, and legal complexity involved in pursuing enforcement were 
often prohibitive—especially if he fled the jurisdiction.53 The wife 
would need to find and follow the man, hire a lawyer and pay 
court fees, and attempt to persuade a court to hold the man in 
contempt of court for refusal to comply with a court order.54 If she 
succeeded, the husband (or ex-husband) might decide to comply, 
at least for a time, or he might sit idly in jail.55 Once the man was 
released, the process might begin again. In some locations, the 
wife would have no further recourse. For instance, New York al-
lowed only a one-time, six-month jail term for contempt of an or-
der, and then noncompliance brought no further legal  
consequences.56 
The third category of law addressing failure to support was 
the poor law. Derived from Elizabethan statutes, the poor law tra-
ditionally permitted localities to secure fines or payments from 
certain relatives of people who were at risk of becoming public 
charges. The poor law was originally unhelpful to wives because 
 
 52 When men owned assets and especially real property, courts could ensure compli-
ance with support orders through liens, attachment, or security. Stimson, American Stat-
ute Law at § 6266 at 704 (cited in note 51). These options became less effective over time, 
as more men worked for weekly wages. See John Lisle, The Bases of Divorce, 4 J Crim L 
& Criminology 30, 45–46 (1913). 
 53 William H. Baldwin, Family Desertion and Non-Support Laws 13 (Associated 
Charities 1904) (“Even in the few cases where [the man] has some [property that can be 
reached by civil suit], the expense and delay of prosecuting the suit in the higher courts 
make the remedy practically unavailable.”). 
 54 For representative examples of matrimonial contempt cases, see Lester v Lester, 
63 Ga 357 (1879); Peel v Peel, 50 Iowa 521 (1879); Andrew v Andrew, 20 A 817 (Vt 1890). 
 55 Alimony nonpayers in New York were infamously housed together in a jail dubbed 
the “alimony club.” Why Not a Hotel Suite for the Alimony Club?, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 18 
(Jan 22, 1908). Nearly all courts held that such jailings did not violate constitutional pro-
visions against imprisonment for debt, often on the basis that support payments were a 
duty rather than a debt. See Case Note, Divorce—Alimony—Refusal to Pay Alimony Pun-
ished as Contempt, 30 Harv L Rev 518–19 (1917); Ex parte Davis, 111 SW 394, 396 (Tex 
1908) (denying a writ of habeas seeking release from jail following a contempt order for 
failure to pay). 
 56 This rule applied to all civil contempt but was particularly problematic in the ali-
mony context, in which some men decided it was worthwhile to spend six months in jail to 
avoid a lifetime of payments. The legislature changed the law in 1919, so orders requiring 
repeat payments could result in multiple contempt violations. New Law Has Teeth That 
Bite All Joy from Alimony Club, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 66 (Aug 17, 1919). 
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many provisions did not apply to spouses and payments reim-
bursed poorhouses, rather than going directly to dependents.57 
Yet as judges and legislators refined options available to wealth-
ier women, they simultaneously transformed poor law from an 
outdated method of securing a pittance for destitute kin to a work-
able approach to enforcing men’s marital duties.58 Most notably, 
the revised poor law allowed a wife to initiate suit and receive 
support payments directly.59 In some respects the revised poor 
law was even superior to private civil suits, for eligible candidates 
received government employees’ assistance in court proceedings, 
rather than needing to hire a lawyer or appearing pro se.60 
Like the necessaries doctrine and legal separations, poor law 
had a serious flaw exposed by men’s increasing mobility. The 
reach of the poor law stopped at each state’s borders. Judges 
deemed the poor law “quasi-criminal,” meaning it was penal in 
nature but not subject to the trappings of criminal law.61 Cru-
cially, the quasi-criminal categorization meant poor law charges 
did not qualify for extradition.62 
B. Charity Leaders and the Need for Extradition 
By the late nineteenth century, the inability of existing  
family support laws to reach across state lines troubled charity 
groups, whose limited resources and aversion to almsgiving made 
 
 57 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 
43 Cal L Rev 175, 199 (1955) (“The traditional common law had no occasion to concern 
itself with the duties of maintenance between husband and wife or parent and child.”). 
 58 See, for example, Commonwealth v Teel, 30 Pa County Ct 566 (1905) (discussing 
evolution in Pennsylvania nonsupport statutes, from poor law to quasi-criminal to  
criminal). 
 59 There is not a clear line separating traditional poor law from what I am calling 
“the revised poor law.” States continually modified their poor law from the colonial period 
through at least the early twentieth century. In this Article, “revised poor law” refers to 
penal but not fully criminal statutes that allowed dependents to initiate proceedings 
against men to obtain court orders for regular payments. 
 60 For a step-by-step account of how this legal machinery worked in New York City, 
see The Number of New-York Men Who Pay Alimony Has Increased Since the City Began 
to Collect It, NY Trib Illustrated Supp 5 (Apr 12, 1903). 
 61 Duffy v People, 6 Hill 75 (NY 1843); State v Miller, 52 A 262 (Del 1902). But see 
Schweitzer, 18 A at 787 (finding statute penalizing nonsupport of wife a criminal rather 
than civil prosecution). 
 62 Technically, delivery of fugitives between US states is “rendition,” but this Article 
uses “extradition” to reflect the more common usage in the primary sources. On the inac-
curacy in terminology, see John Bassett Moore, Treatise on Extradition and Interstate 
Rendition, Part II § 516 at 819–20 (1891). 
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charitable support of deserted wives unpalatable.63 Even after a 
severe economic depression in 1893, charity organizations were 
reticent to provide support to needy families. The middle-class, 
white professionals who populated these groups’ memberships64 
feared that providing alms would incentivize men to desert or pro-
vide an opportunity for collusion, in which “the desertion was 
purely fictitious, and designed to extort money from the charita-
bly inclined.”65 At the same time, finding a source of family fund-
ing seemed vital because charity leaders no longer perceived in-
stitutionalizing young children apart from their mothers as 
acceptable.66 Together these concerns raised the importance of se-
curing financial support directly from male providers just as do-
ing so became more challenging.67 
Charity leaders recognized that industrialization, immigra-
tion, urbanization, and improved transportation contributed to 
heightened mobility and anonymity that shielded men from social 
and legal enforcement of their financial obligations.68 In 1900, one 
captured a growing consensus when he described family desertion 
as “an evil of increasing magnitude and menace,” which imposed 
heavy burdens on public and private charitable resources.69 What 
was needed, reformers thought, was federal legislation or, per-
haps more achievable, a felony-level offense to qualify for extra-
dition.70 A turn to criminal law also offered greater deterrence, 
appropriate moral condemnation of deserters, and the possibility 
of attractive new enforcement methods.71 
 
 63 This aversion was born from developments in the 1870s. Michael B. Katz, In the 
Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 58, 68–75, 85 (Basic 
Books 1986); Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Wel-
fare in America 91–96 (Free Press 6th ed 1999). 
 64 Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse at 79 (cited in note 63). 
 65 Family Deserters: All Day Conference at Charities Building—Remedies Suggested, 
NY Daily Trib 7 (Apr 30, 1903). See also Ada Eliot, Deserted Wives, 10 Charities Rev 346, 
347–48 (1900) (discussing risk of spousal collusion). 
 66 Edward T. Devine, The Breaking Up of Families, 10 Charities Rev 461, 461–62 
(1900) (original source incorrectly labels page 462 as page 362). For more context, see  
David S. Tanenhaus, Growing Up Dependent: Family Preservation in Early Twentieth-
Century Chicago, 19 Law & Hist Rev 547, 549–50 (2001) (discussing a historical trend 
away from institutionalization and toward family unit preservation). 
 67 See, for example, Mary Richmond, Proper Treatment of Idle or Drinking Men and 
Their Neglected Families: “Married Vagabonds”, 4 Charities Rev 401, 401–02 (1895). 
 68 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 5–9 (cited in note 53). 
 69 Devine, 10 Charities Rev at 464 (cited in note 66). 
 70 Id at 465. 
 71 Id at 464–65; Eliot, 10 Charities Rev at 348 (cited in note 65). 
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While making nonsupport extraditable was uncontroversial 
among charity reformers, the choice between a felony and a mis-
demeanor spurred debate.72 For instance, charity leaders at an 
all-day conference on the subject of “Family Desertions” in 1903 
began by reading “extracts from [an] exhaustive memorandum” 
on the application of extradition law.73 The ensuing discussion 
prompted the National Conference of Charities and Correction to 
issue resolutions that condemned desertion as a “serious evil,” 
identified extradition as “the most effective remedy and deter-
rent,” and implored governors to cooperate in submitting and hon-
oring rendition requests.74 Many charity leaders concluded that a 
felony law best guaranteed that extradition would occur. 75 By 
1904, four states had felony-level offenses in place.76 
But reformers also realized that felony-level criminalization 
brought practical, political, and legal challenges. Practical con-
cerns included that a felony might motivate men to desert further 
away to reduce the likelihood of being caught, impose a harmful 
stigma on convicts, expose men to corrupting influences in prison, 
 
 72 See, for example, Broken Hearted Woman, Buffalo Evening News 17 (June 21, 
1895); Needy Families in Their Homes, 9 Charities 17, 18 (1902). 
 73 Conference on Family Desertions: Law to Make Desertion of Wife and Children a 
Felony Is Advocated in New York, 10 Charities 483 (1903). Extradition law in the sur-
rounding period was in a state of confusion. In an effort to agree on general principles and 
procedures, most states sent representatives to the Inter-State Extradition Conference of 
1887. During the Conference, participants sought to increase uniformity and reciprocity 
without requiring extradition of “petty” offenses (even though the Extradition Clause of 
the Constitution makes no such distinction, as they acknowledged). Though the partici-
pants did not discuss nonsupport specifically, they described the somewhat related offense 
of bastardy as falling in the “petty” category. This discussion likely contributed to the per-
ception that misdemeanor nonsupport might not qualify for extradition. Proceedings of the 
Inter-State Extradition Conference, Held at the Rooms of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, August 23d, 24th and 25th 1887 24–29, 66–69, 87, 95 (Argus 1887). See 
also Fred Somkin, The Strange Career of Fugitivity in the History of Interstate Extradition, 
1984 Utah L Rev 511, 517–18. 
 74 Family Desertion Resolutions, 10 Charities 488 (1903). 
 75 See, for example, Helen Foss, The Genus Deserter: His Singularities and Their 
Social Consequences—A Study of Local Fact and Interstate Remedies, 10 Charities 456, 
458–60 (1903). 
 76 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 15 (cited in note 53). At least two states made non-
support of wives a misdemeanor in the 1860s, a development that historians have over-
looked, but this was a minority approach until the period discussed in this Article. For 
evidence of these statutes, see Missouri v Larger, 45 Mo 510 (1870); An Act to Protect Mar-
ried Women from the Willful Abandonment or Neglect of Their Husbands, Tarborough 
Southerner (North Carolina) § 2 (May 20, 1869). Some states passed criminal child aban-
donment laws in the 1870s, but these typically applied to extreme circumstances and were 
not used to obtain support payments. For example, Cowley v People, 8 Abb N Cas 1 (NY 
1880) (discussing an 1876 statute). 
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and perhaps lessen authorities’ willingness to enforce the law be-
cause of a perception it was too harsh.77 Recognition that a felony 
law might be more difficult to pass led some legislators to pursue 
a misdemeanor instead.78 
Felony doubters found their champion in William H.  
Baldwin, a member of the Board of Managers of the Associated 
Charities of Washington, DC. In 1904, Baldwin published an in-
fluential overview of existing nonsupport laws and a model stat-
ute to secure extradition and effective enforcement.79 Baldwin 
marshalled evidence—from constitutional analysis, case law, and 
correspondence with state attorneys general—to prove that mis-
demeanor nonsupport would qualify for and actually receive ex-
tradition. 80  Building on existing critiques of felonies, Baldwin 
added that juries might be less likely to convict on felony offenses 
and that nonsupport cases should be heard in the “court of lowest 
rank” (which would not be permissible for a felony offense) to 
avoid delays and court fees.81 Baldwin’s proposed uniform law 
was therefore a misdemeanor.82 
Baldwin spoke and published widely, persuading many char-
ity workers and legislators across the country that the misde-
meanor approach permitted extradition and was preferable for 
strategic reasons.83 His vision gained further prominence in 1906, 
when Congress passed a misdemeanor nonsupport law for the 
District of Columbia based directly on his proposal.84 Baldwin’s 
model and its successes in DC, in turn, were credited as the inspi-
ration for the Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act (“Uniform 
Act”) promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
in 1910. The Uniform Act led to passage of additional criminal 
laws, mostly at the misdemeanor level.85 
 
 77 Should Wife Desertion Be Made a Felony, Punishable by Imprisonment?, Boston Post 
27 (Nov 15, 1903). See also Extradition of Deserting Husbands, 14 Charities 773, 774 (1905). 
 78 Make Wife Desertion Criminal, Pittston Gazette 4 (Feb 11, 1903); Many Wives Are 
Deserted Annually in Pennsylvania, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader 4 (Feb 12, 1903). 
 79 See generally Baldwin, Family Desertion (cited in note 53). 
 80 Id at 30–46. 
 81 Id at 15–16, 19, 47, 53. 
 82 Id (“A Uniform Law Relative to Family Desertion and Non-Support” in unnum-
bered appendix). 
 83 See, for example, William H. Baldwin, An Extraditable Offense: Not Necessary for 
Desertion to Be a Felony to Bring Back Fugitive, Wash Post 9 (July 17, 1905); William H. 
Baldwin, Family Desertion and Non-Support Laws, 14 Charities 660 (1905). 
 84 See Wife Deserters’ Fate: Must Support Families or Go to the Workhouse, Wash 
Post 3 (Apr 18, 1906). 
 85 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform 
Desertion Act 3 n 1 (Railway Printing 1910) (describing influence of Baldwin and DC law); 
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Importantly, reformers, legislators, and lawyers supported 
the passage and use of criminal nonsupport laws, even though 
they knew that the preexisting civil options remained available.86 
Advocates of criminalization explained that the criminal law 
avoided many of the civil laws’ obstacles. In civil cases the wife 
had to hire a lawyer, pay court fees, clear fault-related eviden-
tiary hurdles, and obtain an initial order for separate mainte-
nance or alimony. These steps all too often culminated in the neg-
ligent provider’s refusal to comply. The wife then had to pursue 
another hearing to ask a judge to incarcerate the man for con-
tempt. This outcome provided no financial relief to his depend-
ents.87 Criminal procedure was more streamlined and cheaper for 
the wife. Contempt seemed worthwhile only in minor, limited con-
texts. The Uniform Act, for instance, authorized the use of con-
tempt to enforce an order pendente lite (requiring a criminal de-
fendant to support his family until the conclusion of the criminal 
proceeding).88 In the words of one state supreme court in 1914, its 
legislature’s decision to pass a criminal nonsupport statute cre-
ated “a sharper and more effective spear.”89 
By the early 1910s, legislators in nearly every state had crim-
inalized nonsupport.90 Though misdemeanor statutes were the 
most popular, many states simultaneously maintained quasi-
criminal and felony laws.91 The existence of several nonsupport 
statutes was designed to permit prosecutorial discretion and a 
range of procedural options. For example, when Pennsylvania leg-
islators debated passing a misdemeanor, they explained courts 
could still use the preexisting quasi-criminal procedure “in all or-
dinary cases . . . , which would have the advantage of greater 
 
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Pro-
ceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Annual Conference Meeting 283 (Lord Baltimore 1944) (listing 
dates states adopted Uniform Act). 
 86 See notes 53–56. 
 87 See, for example, Baldwin, Family Desertion at 13 (cited in note 53). 
 88 Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 6–7, 
9 (cited in note 85). 
 89 State v Yocum, 106 NE 705, 705–06 (Ind 1914). See also State v Francis, 269 P 
878, 880 (Or 1928) (“[T]he penalty for a contempt is not as severe as for the crime of failure 
to support; the latter is an extraditable crime.”); State v McMains, 241 P2d 976, 979 (Okla 
App 1952) (recounting why civil remedies had proven inadequate against husbands “with-
out estate or honor”). 
 90 By 1916, every state had criminalized either nonsupport or desertion. Willrich, 
City of Courts at 147 (cited in note 16). 
 91 William H. Baldwin, The Present Status of Family Desertion and Non-Support 
Laws 1–3 (2d ed 1912). 
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speed, since it requires no jury.”92 In practice prosecutors took this 
strategy one step further. They extradited using the misde-
meanor law, dropped the charges, and proceeded under the quasi-
criminal statute.93  
In states that also included a felony law, prosecutors rarely 
opted to use it because it brought cumbersome legal machinery, 
lack of cooperation by wives, and other hurdles.94 For instance, in 
New York, felony cases comprised less than 2 percent of the non-
support suits in 1909 and 1910.95 Still, having the felony law 
available seemed beneficial to reformers. Reflecting on the port-
folio of legal options maintained by many states, Baldwin “re-
call[ed] the story of the man who replied to the inquiry of the un-
dertaker, after the death of his mother-in-law, as to whether he 
should embalm, cremate or bury: ‘Embalm, cremate and bury; 
take no chances.’”96 
With criminal nonsupport laws in place, extradition became 
a reality. From 1906 through 1910, 20 states pursued extradition 
of nonsupport offenders, totaling 837 requests.97 In some states 
nonsupport comprised a significant portion of overall extradition 
proceedings. In Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and  
Wisconsin, between 15 and 30 percent of extradition requests 
were for nonsupport.98 Proponents of nonsupport criminalization 
therefore perceived that these laws brought real benefits. 
C. The Application of Probation to Nonsupport Cases 
A near consensus that nonsupport could and should be crim-
inalized did not answer what punishment should be attached. 
Charity workers, legislators, and other stakeholders sought a con-
sequence that would maximize deterrence, preserve the family (at 
 
 92 Many Wives Are Deserted Annually in Pennsylvania, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader 
at 4 (cited in note 78). For an unsuccessful challenge to the denial of jury rights in such 
cases, see Commonwealth v Nagle, 31 Pa Super Ct 175 (1906). 
 93 See generally William H. Baldwin, Is It Lawful to Bring a Man Back to  
Pennsylvania by Extradition on the Charge of Desertion under the Act of March 13, 1903, 
for the Purpose of Proceeding against Him under the Act of April 13, 1867?, 4 J Crim L & 
Criminology 20 (1913). Pennsylvania apparently still used this trick as of 1922. Common-
wealth v Kenney, 80 Pa Super 418, 419 (1923). 
 94 See, for example, 1,800 Deserted Wives, 22 Survey 838 (1909) (noting that a NY 
charity group found that the district attorney’s office disinclined to prosecute desertion 
cases after the offense was made a felony). 
 95 Baldwin, The Present Status at 7 (cited in note 91). 
 96 Id at 8. 
 97 Id at 19. 
 98 Id. 
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least in a financial sense), and lighten the burden on charities and 
the state to support women and children. 
Beginning in the 1890s, many charity workers expressed op-
timism about the usefulness of imprisonment at hard labor for its 
deterrent value and financial savings. Baldwin was a prominent 
proponent, further suggesting that a system under which a man’s 
prison labor supported his dependents would safeguard “the unity 
of the family . . . in spite of the intervening prison walls.”99 But 
charity workers from other states were less optimistic that this 
would be feasible because their jurisdictions did not have work-
houses or prison farms, or reserved these options for those impris-
oned for at least a year. Other locales lacked legal authority to 
give proceeds to prisoners’ dependents.100  Furthermore, as the 
first decade of the twentieth century progressed, opposition to 
prison labor made this option less promising.101 
Just as imprisonment at hard labor began losing its appeal, 
a new penal method rose to the fore: conditional release on pro-
bation.102 Probation built on a range of legal and social forerun-
ners, such as suspended sentence and “friendly visiting.”103 The 
supervisory and suspended sentence components came together 
in Boston beginning in 1841, and first became formalized in a se-
ries of Massachusetts bills beginning in 1869.104 In the late nine-
teenth century, Boston’s model attracted nationwide attention, 
touted as “an essential part of the criminal mechanism.”105 From 
 
 99 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 56–57 (cited in note 53). 
 100 See, for example, Richmond, 4 Charities Rev at 413–16 (cited in note 67); Wife 
Desertion, 15 Charities 407 (1905) (explaining that imprisonment would not support de-
pendents, especially after changes to the “prison industry” left prisoners idle). 
 101 The Uniform Act drafters noted that some states had abolished or limited prison 
labor “as the result of the influence of the Labor Unions.” Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 5–6 (cited in note 85). See also Rebecca M. 
McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American 
Penal State, 1776–1941 193–238 (Cambridge 2008). 
 102 Compare Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the 
Underclass, 1890–1990 35–37 (Chicago 1993) (discussing connection between restrictions 
on prison labor and rise of parole). 
 103 For discussion of “friendly visiting,” see Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse at 
159–66 (cited in note 63). 
 104 Charles Lionel Chute and Marjorie Bell, Crime, Courts, and Probation 31–66 
(MacMillan 1956). Depending on how “probation” is defined, it can be dated to earlier pe-
riods. For an excellent treatment of a nineteenth-century version, see generally George 
Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 Yale L J 857 (2000). 
 105 “Probation” in Boston: A System Tried in the Courts of that City with Success, NY 
Daily Trib 3 (Mar 27, 1899). 
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1898 through 1903, ten states across the country passed their 
first probation laws. More soon followed.106 
Probation, which typically included both preconviction inves-
tigation and postconviction supervision by court staff titled “pro-
bation officers,” quickly appeared to offer many advantages over 
imprisonment. In New York, which first authorized probation in 
1901, the New York City magistrates identified four benefits: 
(1) “Punishment without disgrace, and effective without produc-
ing embitterment, resentment or demoralization,” (2) judicial dis-
cretion to make the punishment fit the crime, (3) “[p]unishment 
that is borne solely by the guilty and displacing a system that 
frequently involved the innocent and helpless,” and (4) punish-
ment “attended by increased revenue to the City and by a saving 
in expense.”107 
These strengths seemed even more advantageous in the non-
support context. In these cases, a probation officer could first at-
tempt to reconcile the couple outside of formal court proceedings. 
(Many spouses lived together or had a history of separating and 
coming back together, making reconciliation seem plausible.) The 
officer’s intervention often included guidance on behaviors tech-
nically outside the court’s jurisdiction. For instance, a probation 
officer might encourage a husband to drink less alcohol and in-
struct a wife on housekeeping skills. If that failed, the officer in-
vestigated the husband’s income and the family’s home condi-
tions, provided this information to the judge, and oversaw the 
transfer of support payments. Under this method, the male 
breadwinner would remain out of prison, pursuing an ordinary 
occupation, yet be forced to turn over money to his dependents.108 
Many nonsupport statutes also permitted a defendant to “con-
sent” to probation with weekly support payments prior to  
conviction.109 
 
 106 Chute and Bell, Crime, Courts, and Probation at 73, 84 (cited in note 104). 
 107 Annual Report of the Board of City Magistrates of the City of New York (First Di-
vision) for the Year Ending December 31, 1901 15–16 (JW Pratt 1902). 
 108 For descriptions of probation officer tasks in these cases, see “Probation” in Boston, 
NY Daily Trib (cited in note 105); Aid Deserted Wives: New Laws Are Urged in Book by 
W.H. Baldwin, Wash Post 10 (Jan 21, 1912); Six Hundred Men Are on Probation, Buffalo 
Evening News 5 (Oct 31, 1910); Restoring Peace to Broken St. Louis Homes, St Louis Post-
Dispatch B4 (Feb 20, 1916); Leon Stern and Elizabeth Stern, Domestic Relations at Par: 
How Philadelphia Tries to Make Every Marriage Worth Its Face Value to Both Society and 
the Couple Involved, 72 Good Housekeeping 65 (1921). 
 109 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 71, 79, 124, 135 (cited in note 53); Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 7 (cited in note 85). 
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Court statistics document that judges increasingly relied on 
probation in nonsupport cases. In New York City, the second most 
common reason men were placed on probation in 1902 was a non-
support conviction.110 States soon amended their laws to explicitly 
provide for probation in this context.111 In some places legisla-
tures originally authorized adult probation exclusively or primar-
ily for nonsupport offenders.112 
Criminal nonsupport cases became the poster crime for adult 
probation because the financial and moral benefits seemed obvi-
ous. Men convicted of nonsupport were not perceived as danger-
ous. Rather, their conduct violated middle-class, gendered norms 
in ways that lawmakers and law implementers believed proba-
tion officers could fix.113 In a representative newspaper article 
from 1903, the author praised “the recent general adoption of pro-
bation methods by a number of the more important cities and 
states,” yet the only specific offense he discussed was nonsup-
port.114 In nonsupport cases, probation meant “the husband is 
sent back to his home and employment under supervision, and, 
consequently, neither is he kept a burden on the state in prison 
or are his wife and children thrown upon the public or private 
charity through the loss of the head of the family.”115 In addition 
to financial savings, the article continued, probation supervision 
was imposed “with the hope of possibly restoring [the man] to a 
worthy and self-respecting citizenship.”116 
Probation proponents strategically emphasized the collection 
of support payments as tangible evidence of probation’s value. 
 
 110 Annual Report of the Board of City Magistrates of the City of New York (First Di-
vision) for the Year Ending December 31, 1902 10–11 (JW Pratt 1903). 
 111 New York amended its statute in 1903 to explicitly apply to nonsupport, and New 
Jersey passed a law titled “Deserting Husbands Placed on Probation” in 1905. Report of 
the Probation Commission of the State of New York 232, 240 (Brandow 1906). 
 112 Probation Manual with Analysis of the Probation Laws of Virginia 4 (St Bd Char-
ities and Correction 1918) (noting that when Virginia authorized probation in 1904, it was 
“to be used chiefly in case of adults who failed to support their children”). 
 113 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were parallel efforts by 
affluent women and government officials to enforce gendered expectations on poor women 
through control over private and public charity. There is a rich literature on this topic. See 
Willrich, 87 J Am Hist at 462 n 4 (cited in note 16) (listing major contributions). On an 
earlier period, see generally Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 
1789–1860 (Knopf 1986). 
 114 William H. Allen, The Probation System, Its Great Advantages, Atlanta Const C4 
(July 5, 1903). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. For examples of similar arguments in the following decades, see Husbands on 
Probation, San Bernardino County Sun 4 (Aug 20, 1913); Edwin J. Cooley, Mending Bro-
ken Families, 4 Woman’s Home Companion 4, 152–56 (1925). 
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The Massachusetts Commission on Probation’s Fifth Annual Re-
port pointed out an expansion from 617 nonsupporting husbands 
providing $25,218.13 on probation in 1909 to 1,240 nonsupporting 
husbands submitting $140,773.96 in 1913.117  A Massachusetts 
probation officer who coauthored a book promoting the method 
reported that officers in his state collected $219,984 for wives and 
children in 1915, whereas the whole probation system cost only 
$148,000. 118  Similarly, a 1918 Virginia probation manual con-
cluded that probation was “highly economical. Keep a man at 
work; require him to support his family, and you save the public 
from supporting the entire family.”119 
Probation officials also stressed the affordability of probation 
as compared to imprisonment. In a nearly full-page discussion of 
probation printed in the New York Tribune in 1920, New York 
City’s Chief Probation Officer, Edwin J. Cooley, noted: “It costs 
$396.56 a year per capita for prison care in New York and only 
$22.64 for probation care.” Moreover, Cooley continued, “Men on 
probation support themselves and their families and they are pro-
ductive factors in the community,” rather than their families be-
coming “a burden upon the public.”120 Economic arguments be-
came more compelling in the heat of perceived crime waves. 
Advocates emphasized the sizable proportion of uncontroversial 
and lucrative nonsupport cases to deflect criticism from proba-
tion’s alleged role in keeping dangerous criminals on the 
streets.121 
Unsurprisingly, the men most likely to receive probation sen-
tences were poor and often from immigrant or minority groups, 
although the populations varied by location. In New York City, 
probation proponents initially focused on European immi-
grants,122 whereas in Southern cities, black-white racial dynamics 
were more prominent.123 Although certain groups were more often 
 
 117 Proposes Women Probation Officers, Boston Daily Globe 6 (Jan 28, 1914). 
 118 Lewis E. MacBrayne and James P. Ramsay, One More Chance: An Experiment in 
Human Salvage 167 (Small, Maynard 1916). 
 119 Probation Manual at 3 (cited in note 112). 
 120 Getting Back to the Straight and Narrow Path; One Slip No Longer Makes a Con-
firmed Criminal, NY Trib 79 (Oct 17, 1920). 
 121 Defense of Probation, NY Times 85 (Aug 6, 1922). See also generally NY Division 
of Probation—Department of Correction, Probation: Do You Know That (1928). 
 122 Probation to Be Extended to Higher Criminal Courts, NY Times X15 (Feb 8, 1925) 
(discussing earlier probation work). 
 123 For example, Praise: By Judge Wilson for Colored Probation Officers, Courier-
Journal (Louisville, Ky) 10 (Dec 10, 1906). 
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placed on probation for nonsupport, in large part because of a cor-
relation between nationality or race and poverty, probation rhet-
oric and justifications turned on the nature of the offense rather 
than pointing to categories of men warranting supervision. 124 
Nevertheless, that men from some groups were more often subject 
to probation oversight may have eased the method’s acceptance. 
And, over time, probation treatment of these men may have 
shaped stereotypes about them. 
The intervention of probation officers in the behaviors and 
finances of married couples marked a major change in the state’s 
involvement in family affairs. No government officials were allo-
cated to reconcile couples or assist dependents in pursuing finan-
cial support under the guise of necessaries cases or in the context 
of separation agreements, separate maintenance, or divorce with 
alimony—all of which remained options even as criminal law 
spread.125 Officials did facilitate the filing and processing of poor 
law cases, but in those matters they did not seek to reconcile cou-
ples or surveil compliance and other family behaviors. Criminali-
zation accompanied by probation opened distinctly new opportu-
nities for state regulation of family life. 
 
 124 This assessment is based on the author’s review of hundreds of newspaper articles 
and other primary sources. 
 125 There were some efforts to introduce probation-like techniques in divorce suits, 
but these met with limited success and did not include oversight of support payments. 
Legislatures in a handful of Midwestern and Western states authorized the appointment 
of “divorce proctors” in the 1910s and 1920s. Divorce proctors were tasked with ensuring 
legitimate divorce grounds and attempting to reconcile couples. Their role was justified by 
the state’s interest in preserving marriage. Unlike probation officers, divorce proctors usu-
ally had to be lawyers, and they did not oversee compliance with support orders. Based on 
newspaper accounts, the locations that used divorce proctors most extensively seem to 
have been Kansas City, Missouri; the state of Kansas; large cities and counties in  
Tennessee; and Seattle, Washington. For representative articles, see Proctor as Curb on 
Divorce Evil for Kansas City, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 8 (Nov 8, 1911); Divorce Proctor to 
Guard State, Chi Daily Trib I20 (Feb 23, 1913) (reporting on Kansas State). Nationwide 
press coverage of the first divorce proctors prompted proposals to introduce such officers 
elsewhere, but the vast majority of states never adopted this method of marital interven-
tion. For example, Divorce Proctor Urged; Would Cut Decrees in Half, Chi Daily Trib 1 
(Jan 6, 1912); William Hall Moreland, Five Divorce Remedies, NY Times 1, 80 (June 5, 
1921). Secondary literature also notes similar positions under other names in Arkansas, 
Nebraska, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Charles S. Connolly, Divorce Proctors, 34 BU L 
Rev 1, 1 (1954). In later decades, states tried other methods of predivorce reconciliation. 
One of the more notable examples was the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, which handled 
divorce-seeking couples who had children in the years after WWII. DiFonzo, Beneath the 
Fault Line at 129 (cited in note 16). 
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D. Legal Challenges to Criminal Nonsupport Enforcement  
Though widely praised by charity leaders, lawmakers, and 
journalists, criminal nonsupport laws faced some opposition fo-
cused on their blurring of criminal and civil goals, remedies, and 
procedures. For instance, one New York City magistrate con-
demned how in nonsupport cases the court “enforce[d] a civil ob-
ligation by criminal procedure, although imprisonment for debt 
was long ago abolished in every enlightened community.”126 A 
New York organization focused on addressing family nonsupport 
objected to proposals to elevate wife abandonment to a felony be-
cause it did not want to allow a scenario in which a wife could 
initiate a criminal case to extradite her husband “at public ex-
pense” to facilitate a civil proceeding, and then use the criminal 
charge to enhance her bargaining power. While ostensibly satis-
fying the organization’s main goal, the civil-criminal slipperiness 
of this scheme struck the group as objectionable “because it gives 
the wife the indirect power of using the criminal law for private 
ends.”127 
Once criminal nonsupport laws were in place, defendants 
sometimes lodged legal objections. Appeals were relatively infre-
quent because most convicts lacked resources. Nevertheless, doz-
ens of cases demonstrate that some men had both the means and 
desire to contest the application or constitutionality of criminal 
nonsupport statutes. Nearly all of these challenges failed.128 
One question defendants raised for decades was whether 
criminal nonsupport encompassed only the public offense of leav-
ing a dependent likely to become a public charge or also reached 
 
 126 Joseph E. Corrigan, Corrigan Speaks Out, NY Daily Trib 7 (Apr 23, 1910). 
 127 National Desertion Bureau, Memoranda in Opposition to Proposed Amendment to 
the Penal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure in Relation to Desertion and Non-Support 
and to Repeal Certain Sections in Such Law and Code Relating Thereto, Known as Senate 
Bill No. 773 *3–4 (March 15, 1916), Community Service Society Archives, Box 18, Folder 
15.23, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University. 
 128 For examples of courts rejecting challenges to criminal nonsupport laws, see Peo-
ple v Heise, 100 NE 1000 (Ill 1913); Martin v People, 168 P 1171 (Colo 1917). The most 
noteworthy case striking down a criminal nonsupport statute was Ex parte Smythe, in 
which the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held its entire nonsupport law unconstitu-
tional, despite its “beneficent” purpose. The court found that a provision directing that the 
defendant’s fine be given to his wife or child violated the state constitution’s ban on “ap-
propriation for private or individual purposes.” The man’s “moral and civil liability to sup-
port the wife and child” could not justify circumventing this prohibition. Ex parte Smythe, 
120 SW 200, 201 (Tex Crim App 1909). 
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what had been a private duty for a man to support his family ac-
cording to his means, in line with the doctrine of necessaries.129 
Charity reformer proposals and resultant statutory language of-
ten left unclear what level of destitution was required for the law 
to apply, as well as whether a guilty verdict required nonsupport, 
desertion, or the combined existence of both. (The Uniform Act 
covered those who “desert or willfully neglect or refuse to provide” 
for wives or children “in destitute or necessitous circum-
stances.”130) While some appellate judges construed nonsupport 
statutes to cover just the public charge scenario on the basis that 
criminal law could only address public harms,131 others recog-
nized legislatures’ power to pass criminal legislation to address 
conduct that carried private and public implications.132 
Over time, most states’ courts embraced a blended public- 
private purpose for their criminal nonsupport laws. An influential 
decision published by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1911 ex-
emplifies this approach. In construing a criminal statute that ap-
plied only when a family was in “destitute or necessitous circum-
stances,” the court pointed to the doctrine of necessaries in 
 
 129 See, for example, People v Stickle, 121 NW 497, 499 (Mich 1909) (construing stat-
utory revision that removed public charge requirement). 
 130 Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 3 (em-
phasis added) (cited in note 85). Some courts got around this uncertainty with broad stat-
utory construction. See, for example, Welch v State, 67 So 224, 225 (Fla 1915) (holding that 
nonsupport itself constituted “desertion”). 
 131 Especially where nonsupport laws evolved directly from poor law, judges inter-
preted them to apply only when dependents were likely to become public charges. An in-
fluential early opinion finding a narrow purpose for a quasi-criminal statute is Douglas v 
Naehr, 30 Hun 461, 463 (NY Gen Term 1883) (“The statute was designed to protect the 
public against the burden of supporting a wife and children . . . It was not intended to give 
the wife any new remedy either directly or indirectly.”). In jurisdictions with such hold-
ings, wives were expected to seek relief under civil statutes. Demos v Demos, 19 NY Ann 
Cas 171, 100 NY Supp 968 (NY App 1906) (directing wife to pursue separation in civil 
court rather than criminal nonsupport suit). A 1925 analysis found that judges in states 
that passed quasi-criminal (revised poor law) or criminal statutes relatively early limited 
application to public charge situations, but those in states with later statutes interpreted 
them more generously. W.A.S., Annotation, Extent or Character of Support Contemplated 
by Statute Making Nonsupport of Wife or Child Offense, 36 ALR 866 (1925). 
 132 For early examples of state supreme courts upholding criminal nonsupport laws, 
see State v Cucullu, 35 S 300, 302 (La 1903); Green v State, 131 SW 463 (Ark 1910). In 
Cucullu, the Supreme Court of Louisiana dismissed a man’s claim that a misdemeanor 
could not properly address duties that were “essentially matters of a civil character.” The 
court explained: “The performance by a husband and father of the legal duties which he 
voluntarily assumed in contracting marriage is a matter which not only affects the partic-
ular parties in interest, but the public at large, as affecting the general public welfare.” 
Cucullu, 35 S at 302. 
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holding that the legislature did not intend to limit the required 
support to “primitive physical needs.” The court explained: 
The law is not a mere poor law. It is a domestic duty law, and 
was intended to cover the case of a woman who is left desti-
tute according to any just and humane estimate of her situa-
tion, although in the eyes of paupers she might appear to be 
rich.133 
Acknowledging that some penal statutes “contemplated nothing 
but redress of the public grievance” of family members becoming 
public charges, the court observed that others “were designed to 
aid civil remedies.”134 In the surrounding decades, most judges 
and other interested commenters likewise embraced the use of 
criminal law to enforce public-private family duties.135 
II.  THE SYMBIOTIC GROWTH OF FAMILY COURTS AND PROBATION 
(1910–1930S) 
This Part investigates how reformers created probation-
backed “courts of domestic relations” to pursue robust enforce-
ment of criminal nonsupport laws. Cities first opened domestic 
relations courts in 1910, as part of a broader Progressive Era 
movement for court reform. Probation officers were among the 
most vocal supporters and essential employees of these new tri-
bunals. The National Probation Association (NPA), which in-
cluded domestic relations judges and probation officers in its 
ranks, led the effort to spread the domestic relations court idea to 
new locations. From the late 1910s into the 1930s, the NPA and 
other probation proponents sought to expand the courts’ jurisdic-
tion into “family courts,” which would encompass juvenile delin-
quency and divorce hearings. They were less successful in that 
effort; nonsupport remained the essential core of family-focused 
courts. 
 
 133 State v Waller, 136 P 215, 216–17 (Kan 1913). See also Brandel v State, 154 NW 
997 (Wis 1915) (expanding on Waller). But see Stedman v State, 86 S 428, 431 (Fla 1920) 
(retaining public charge requirement). 
 134 Waller, 125 P at 217. 
 135 Ewell v State, 114 A2d 66, 69 (Md 1955) (explaining that judges commonly “carried 
over” the standards from the necessaries doctrine when construing “destitute” in criminal 
nonsupport statutes). 
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A. The Creation of Domestic Relations Courts 
As reformers refined the application of criminal nonsupport 
laws through the use of probation, they also considered the oper-
ation of the courts that had jurisdiction over these cases. They 
found these criminal courts, as well as the overall court system in 
many urban locations, lacking in a number of respects. Criminal 
courts were overcrowded, experienced long delays, offered rushed 
and unfair hearings, and were sometimes corrupt. 136  Because 
these courts were one of the primary places the working class and 
newly arrived immigrants interacted with the American legal 
system, many judges, politicians, and social welfare leaders 
thought court reform would aid in inculcating respect for law and 
Americanizing litigants.137 
One major facet of early twentieth-century court reform was 
the specialization of courts. While subsets of courts had long fo-
cused on particular subjects, 138  Progressive Era reformers 
thought further specialization would secure efficiency and exper-
tise.139 Perhaps most famously, in 1899 they inaugurated a move-
ment for juvenile courts to hear children’s delinquency and de-
pendency cases.140 The juvenile court concept spread quickly, so 
that by 1917, all but three states introduced these courts for at 
least some of their cities.141 
The push for specialization extended to marital litigation, 
with New York taking the lead. It was not obvious to  
 
 136 See, for example, Franklin Matthews, The Farce of Police Court Justice in New 
York, 17 New Broadway Mag 511 (1907). 
 137 “Police Court and the Public”: This Subject Discussed before the People’s Institute, 
NY Daily Trib 4 (Dec 29, 1900). 
 138 For histories of specialized courts in New York beginning in the seventeenth  
century, see Past State Courts (Historical Society of the New York Courts), archived at 
http://perma.cc/XU4F-BK68. 
 139 Willrich, City of Courts at xxxii–xxxix (cited in note 16). 
 140 While Chicago is typically credited as opening the first juvenile court in 1899, cities 
experimented with treating juvenile delinquents differently and apart from adult criminals in 
earlier decades. There is an extensive literature on juvenile courts. For a helpful historiography, 
see generally Miroslava Chavez-Garcia, Book Review, In Retrospect: Anthony M. Platt’s The 
Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency, 35 Rev Am Hist 464 (2007). 
 141 Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 10 (Chicago 2d 
ed 1977). Another example of specialized courts from this period is “women’s courts,” 
which primarily handled prostitution cases. For excellent treatments, see Amy J. Cohen, 
Trauma and the Welfare State: A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York City, 95 
Tex L Rev 915, 933–36 (2017); Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s Critique 
of New York City’s Women’s Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the “Problem” of 
Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 Fordham Urb L J 665, 669–76 (2006). 
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New Yorkers, however, which categories of cases warranted sep-
arate, special treatment.142 In 1902, lawyers in that state pushed 
for a “Domestic Relations Court” to hear divorce cases.143 This ef-
fort stalled for political and legal reasons.144 
Starting around 1905, attention turned to creating special-
ized “abandonment courts” to tackle the rising number of  
nonsupport cases. Proponents of this idea, mostly charity leaders, 
hoped that more systematic treatment of nonsupport offenses by 
probation officers in specialized courts would secure support, re-
lieve the burden on general criminal courts, keep innocent wives 
and children from mingling with criminals while awaiting their 
proceedings, and reconcile families to reduce the divorce rate.145  
Though judges shared charity leaders’ enthusiasm about the 
use of probation officers in nonsupport cases, they argued that a 
specialized court was unnecessary and unappealing.146 Judges did 
not want to preside over what they expected would be a tiresome 
and monotonous docket. The chief magistrate, in a line widely 
quoted by newspapers, suggested that a judge assigned to the en-
visioned nonsupport court “will have to be descended straight 
from the angels.”147 
Despite some judges’ aversion, the New York legislature  
designated a branch of New York City’s criminal courts as the 
country’s first “court of domestic relations” in 1910.148 The court’s 
 
 142 In 1894, New York judges unsuccessfully proposed a Court of Domestic Relations 
with “jurisdiction of all wills, estates, the relations of guardian and ward, the care of lu-
natics, and divorces.” Untitled Article (beginning with “Several of the jurists . . .”), NY 
Daily Trib 6 (Apr 30, 1894). 
 143 For a Special Divorce Court, Baltimore Sun 1 (July 8, 1902). 
 144 Divorce Cases Clog Courts, Atlanta Const A7 (Jan 16, 1910). 
 145 Alfred E. Ommen, Criminal Courts in General: Some Observations by a City Mag-
istrate, 43 J Soc Sci 38, 40–42 (1905); An Abandonment Court May Be Created Here,  
Brooklyn Daily Eagle 18 (May 30, 1907); A Matrimonial Court to End Domestic Wars, NY 
Times 6 (Jan 12, 1906). 
 146 The specialized court proposal received thorough attention during hearings on re-
forming New York City’s inferior criminal court system in 1908 and 1909. New York, 1 
Proceedings of the Commission to Inquire into the Courts of Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction 
in Cities of the First Class (JB Lyon 1909). For judges’ commentary, see id at 396, 484, 
605–06, 639, 649, 672, 724, 744. See also New York, 2 Proceedings of the Commission to 
Inquire into the Courts of Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction in the Cities of the First Class 
1408 (JB Lyon 1909). 
 147  New York, 3 Proceedings of the Commission to Inquire into the Courts of Inferior 
Criminal Jurisdiction in the Cities of the First Class 2411–12 (JB Lyon 1909); Want Spe-
cial Court for Domestic Woes, NY Times 4 (Jan 29, 1909). 
 148 For Court Reform: Commission to Recommend Abandonment of Tribunal, NY 
Daily Trib 5 (Dec 21, 1909). For more detail, including attention to involvement by reli-
gious groups, see Igra, Wives without Husbands at 38–44 (cited in note 16). 
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sole jurisdiction was over quasi-criminal nonsupport, and it relied 
heavily on probation officers at every step. Soon after the court’s 
opening, articles published across the country described its suc-
cesses and cast it as “a kind of local Hague tribunal for the 
home.”149 
Other large cities followed New York’s lead. By the end of the 
decade, domestic relations courts had opened in Buffalo (1910); 
Chicago (1911); Boston (1912); Detroit (1913); Cincinnati,  
Philadelphia, and Springfield, Massachusetts (1914); Dayton, 
Ohio (1915); Richmond, Virginia (1916); Youngstown and  
Summit, Ohio (1917); Portland, Oregon; Norfolk, Virginia; and 
Lincoln and Omaha, Nebraska (1919).150 Probation was a central 
feature in these courts, too. In the words of an incoming Detroit 
judge, who had just toured other courts to prepare for his role, a 
probation system was such “a positive necessity” that to not pro-
vide it “would be almost an official sin.”151 Reformers in other cit-
ies also proposed domestic relations courts but were unable to 
overcome political opposition or state constitutions that made al-
tering court jurisdiction too difficult.152 
While the scope of these new courts somewhat varied, the 
common thread and most common category on court dockets was 
quasi-criminal or criminal nonsupport. Many of the earliest 
adopters followed New York’s lead in delegating only nonsupport 
matters.153 Others permitted somewhat broader jurisdiction (of-
ten concurrent with other courts, a perennial source of tension 
and confusion), yet records indicate their tribunals focused pri-
marily on nonsupport. For example, the Chicago court had juris-
diction over a range of unlawful adult-child conduct (such as sel-
ling tobacco to children and violating child labor laws) but 
reported in its first year that nonsupport comprised more than 
 
 149 E.W., A Domestic Relations Court, St Louis Post-Dispatch 2 (Apr 14, 1912). 
 150 Boushy, The Historical Development of the Domestic Relations Court at *8, 156, 
232–33, 256, 317, 411–17 (cited in note 16); Lincoln’s First Domestic Relations Court Be-
gins to Straighten Out Family Tangles, Lincoln Star 13 (July 20, 1919); Bernard Flexner, 
Reuben Oppenheimer, and Katharine F. Lenroot, The Child, the Family and the Court: A 
Study of the Administration of Justice in the Field of Domestic Relations 65–67 (Bureau of 
Publication 1929); Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Norfolk, Virginia: Fifty Year 
History, 1919 to 1969 1 (Norfolk 1969). 
 151 Arthur J. Lacy, The Domestic Relations Court of the County of Wayne: Preliminary 
Observations 5 (Conway Brief 1913). 
 152 For example, Wants Marital Court, Baltimore Sun 7 (Jan 16, 1913); Bill Is Drafted 
for a Domestic Relations Court, St Louis Post-Dispatch A12B (Jan 3, 1915); For Family 
Wars, LA Times II2 (Nov 2, 1914). 
 153 Edward F. Waite, Courts of Domestic Relations, 5 Minn L Rev 161, 164 (1921). 
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70 percent of its caseload.154 Statistics collected over the next dec-
ade likewise showed that more than half of that court’s docket 
was nonsupport.155 The two notable exceptions to the nonsupport 
focus in the 1910s were the Detroit and Ohio tribunals, which  
included divorce.156 
Largely because of their focus on nonsupport, domestic rela-
tions courts were typically envisioned as “poor people’s courts.” 
Poverty made men less able to provide and incentivized wives to 
pursue formal interventions, so working class families were more 
likely to fall within the courts’ purview.157 Many legal aid organi-
zations refused to provide assistance for those seeking divorce, 
leaving criminal nonsupport as the most readily available option 
for the working class.158 By contrast, the wealthy could afford to 
hire lawyers and pay court fees to secure separate maintenance 
or divorce orders available in higher courts.159 
Nevertheless, domestic relations courts were not the exclu-
sive domain of the poor. In the context of early twentieth-century 
urban living, many wives could not afford the costs in higher 
courts, lacked the grounds necessary to prevail in such proceed-
ings, or were opposed to formal separations for religious or social 
reasons. And middle- or upper-class husbands might come on 
hard times or feel justified in refusing to support wives who, with-
out good cause in the men’s view, refused to live with them or 
deprived them of their children’s company. For these reasons, as 
newspaper articles plentifully document, middle-class and even 
wealthy men were not immune to criminal proceedings.160 In fact, 
wealthy men may have been attractive candidates for extradition 
 
 154 William H. Baldwin, The Court of Domestic Relations of Chicago, 3 J Crim L & Crim-
inology 400 (1912); Sixth Annual Report of the Municipal Court of Chicago for the Year  
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 155 Cora M. Winchell, A Study of the Court of Domestic Relations of the City of Chicago 
as an Agency in the Stabilization of the Home *2 (unpublished MA thesis, The University 
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 159 See Part I.A. 
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because of the likelihood that the expense of transporting them 
would prove worthwhile.161 
Probation-backed, criminal domestic relations courts greatly 
improved dependents’ ability to secure financial support from de-
linquent breadwinners, as compared to earlier civil options. Ac-
cording to one expert who studied the administration of justice in 
the late 1910s, the criminal approach to nonsupport was simpler 
and cheaper. A wife participating in a criminal case need not hire 
a lawyer because a court clerk assisted her in completing newly 
simplified forms to initiate suit, the probation department (“an 
indispensable adjunct of every domestic relations court”162) col-
lected necessary evidence and, depending on location, a probation 
officer (informally) or a government prosecutor represented the 
wife’s interests during the trial, which was typically quick. 
Whereas civil orders in other courts “inevitably” led to the addi-
tional cost and delay of contempt litigation to secure payments, 
criminal suits meant a probation officer was tasked with oversee-
ing collection and initiating summary proceedings for noncompli-
ance. The expert thus predicted that “the territorial expansion of 
domestic relations courts will be rapid.”163 
B. Probation Organizations and the “Family Court” Proposal 
Because probation officers received significant employment 
and positive publicity from handling nonsupport cases, they were 
deeply invested in the success and spread of specialized domestic 
relations courts. They and their organizations pressed for the 
opening of these institutions in new locations and, by the late 
1910s, for the expansion of the tribunals into “family courts,” with 
jurisdiction over other family litigation as well.  
Beginning in the early twentieth century, probation officers 
began formulating a distinct professional identity and founded  
 
 161 For examples of wealthy men extradited for nonsupport, see John A. Farwell Is 
Arrested as Wife Deserter, Chi Daily Trib 15 (July 12, 1919) (“Chicago real estate man” 
whose mother had inherited almost a million dollars); Brooklyn Pitcher Waives Extradi-
tion, Hartford Courant 17 (Sept 6, 1917); To Face Wife’s Non-Support Charge: Art Dealer 
Is Taken East after Fight against Extradition, LA Times 18 (June 18, 1918); To Extradite 
Twombly, NY Times 22 (Dec 1, 1931) (“inventor and millionaire”). 
 162 Smith, Justice and the Poor at 78 (cited in note 158). 
 163 Id at 76, 78–80, 82. 
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organizations to improve and promote their work. The most influ-
ential of their associations was the NPA, formed in 1907.164 From 
its early years, the NPA supported the establishment of special-
ized domestic relations courts to better treat nonsupport cases, 
and many of its members were domestic relations probation offic-
ers and judges.165 By the time of the NPA’s annual conference in 
1916, the first year for which full records are available, the pres-
idential address described domestic relations courts as “an out-
growth of probation” and suggested: “Any community which has 
not established a domestic relations court is neglectful of its wel-
fare.”166 During the same meeting, the NPA created the “Commit-
tee on Courts of Domestic Relations,” then one of only four per-
manent committees. The organization also enshrined a focus on 
domestic relations courts in its bylaws.167 
Newspaper articles, conference proceedings, and commis-
sioned reports demonstrate that the NPA promoted domestic re-
lations courts with probation staffs and worked to strengthen and 
standardize the tribunals across jurisdictions. 168  By 1920, the 
NPA president referred to courts of domestic relations as “essen-
tially probation courts,” and declared that “probation work in the 
family courts is really the heart of the probation service in any 
system.”169 
The NPA and other likeminded reformers were crucial par-
ticipants in spreading the domestic relations court model, but 
they were less successful in their effort to expand the courts’  
jurisdiction to encompass two areas of law they saw as interre-
lated: juvenile delinquency and divorce.170 Beginning in the late 
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1910s, NPA members argued that combining criminal  
nonsupport, juvenile delinquency, and divorce into a unified  
“family court” would reduce jurisdictional overlap and ensure 
deep, rehabilitative treatment by probation officers across family-
related conflicts.171 Probation supervision was already common-
place in juvenile courts. Judges and commenters typically justi-
fied placing children on probation pursuant to the chancery doc-
trine of parens patriae. 172  By contrast, courts rarely used 
probation officers in divorce—a context in which neither the 
state’s criminal powers nor parens patriae reached. The useful-
ness of probation in nonsupport led some to envision probation 
officers performing many of the same duties in divorce cases:  
attempting reconciliations, investigating home life, and oversee-
ing alimony payments.173 
Family court advocates encountered strong opposition.  
Juvenile-focused discussants feared the proposed merger would 
harm the functioning of juvenile courts by reintroducing the crim-
inal posture they had worked hard to minimize and by diverting 
precious resources.174 Legal experts emphasized the difficulty in 
combining these matters within existing court structures, as the 
three categories of cases “cut across the arbitrary lines . . . be-
tween civil and criminal jurisdiction and between inferior and 
general jurisdiction.”175 Lawyers objected to moving divorce litiga-
tion because it might hurt their bottom line by rendering their 
services unnecessary. Others saw political impediments based on 
cost or general doubt about court reform.176 Thus, although the 
 
 171 Charles W. Hoffman, Developments in Family Court Work, in Social Treatment of 
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NPA’s family court proposal inspired change in some places, over-
all it resulted in a splintered view of what family-focused courts 
could and should do.177 
The mixed success of the NPA proposal led to variation in the 
dozens of domestic relations and family courts that were reformed 
or founded in the 1920s and 1930s,178 yet the common ingredients 
remained jurisdiction over criminal nonsupport and the use of 
probation.179 So central were these components that locations un-
able to open specialized courts imported similar approaches. 
Many places grouped nonsupport cases on designated days or be-
fore specific judges and modeled their probation or like services 
on successful domestic relations court examples.180 Thus, while 
there was diversity in the organization and jurisdiction of courts, 
in the words of the Omaha, Nebraska, family court judge, “the 
method of handling these family cases is usually similar.” More 
specifically, the judge observed: “Effective probation work is the 
heart and soul of a successful family court.”181 
III.  FROM CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT TO “CIVIL” CHILD SUPPORT 
(1933–1950S) 
Though criminal family courts with probation staffs rendered 
nonsupport enforcement more effective than under the preexist-
ing options, critics increasingly identified procedural and practi-
cal disadvantages of the criminal law. In 1933, New Yorkers de-
signed a “civil” nonsupport law that mirrored criminal 
enforcement in its use of probation and incarceration and that re-
tained further state power by allowing judges to revert to criminal 
law when preferable. This approach, while addressing some prob-
lems, did not reach men outside the state. The solution that pre-
vailed by the 1950s was nationwide passage of a uniform recipro-
cal law that allowed the civil enforcement of family support duties 
 
 177 Hoffman, Developments in Family Court Work at 55–56 (cited in note 171). 
 178 A US Children’s Bureau publication attempting to summarize the terrain in 1929 
identified “at least” five “different types of organization” for institutions labeled “court of 
domestic relations” or “family court,” and each contained its own variation. Flexner, Op-
penheimer, and Lenroot, The Child, the Family and the Court at 15–17 (cited in note 150). 
 179 See Chester Vernier, 3 American Family Laws: A Comparative Study of the Family 
Law of the Forty-Eight American States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii (to 
Jan. 1, 1935) 141–43 (Stanford 1935). 
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across state lines. Reciprocal enforcement required extensive in-
volvement by court staff, a marked departure from the civil op-
tions available in prior decades. Because state employee partici-
pation and oversight had been normalized in criminal cases, most 
observers did not find this development problematic. All states 
retained criminal law for deterrence and to use against the most 
incorrigible offenders, but civil suits became more attractive and 
therefore more frequent. Federalization later reinforced the civil-
criminal scheme. 
As the 1950s progressed, family court dockets became 
weighted toward civil matters because of the shift to civil  
nonsupport and incorporation of divorce jurisdiction. Despite 
these changes, the courts’ powers, procedures, and personnel re-
tained elements of their criminal origins. The influence and in-
volvement of the state—cultivated in the context of criminal sup-
port litigation and embodied in the probation officer—was 
preserved in the “civil” family courts. Incarceration for noncom-
pliance was ever-present, either through contempt or under the 
retained criminal laws. 
A. “Novel and Ingenious”: “Civil” Support Enforcement 
By the early 1930s, social welfare leaders and lawyers iden-
tified drawbacks to criminal nonsupport laws and domestic rela-
tions courts. At the same time, they wished to preserve the rela-
tively robust staffing and coercive powers developed in the 
criminal context. New York reformers were again at the forefront, 
devising a “civil” nonsupport law and court that retained the core 
components of the criminal approach: probation and  
incarceration. 
Social, economic, and legal developments coalesced to par-
tially undermine the attractiveness of criminal nonsupport laws. 
Women’s increasing political and economic power prompted   
questions about whether severe sanctions were appropriate when 
husbands failed to support them.182 Widespread unemployment 
during the Great Depression raised awareness that the harshness 
of criminal law might be unfair or counterproductive.183 By the 
late 1920s, social welfare leaders advocated handling nonsupport 
 
 182 See, for example, Arthur Stringer, It Is the Man Who Pays and Pays: Modern 
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 183 See, for example, Domestic Court’s Data Lays Strife to Lack of Work, Brooklyn 
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as a “social” rather than criminal problem to facilitate rehabilita-
tion184 and reduce “unnecessary stigma.”185 Meanwhile, lawyers 
condemned state-level criminal procedure’s “red tape” 186  and 
“loopholes” for causing delays.187  Compounding the pessimistic 
take on criminal enforcement in New York, an investigation into 
New York City’s inferior criminal court system—of which the  
domestic relations court remained part—revealed widespread  
corruption.188 
These concerns, in conjunction with the influence of the 
NPA’s “family court” model, motivated New Yorkers to lobby their 
legislature to remove the domestic relations court from the infe-
rior criminal court system.189 In 1933, New York legislators re-
sponded by creating a standalone family court they somewhat 
confusedly called a “Domestic Relations Court.” This court had 
two divisions: a “Family Court” (focused on nonsupport) and a 
“Children’s Court” (for juvenile delinquency and some offenses 
committed against children).190  
One goal of the Family Court division, as compared to its pre-
decessor domestic relations court, was to lessen the tribunal’s rep-
utation as only serving poor people.191 The statute removed the 
public charge requirement for eligibility, allowed judges to grant 
more generous awards (“a fair and reasonable sum”), 192  and  
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absorbed jurisdiction over nonpayment of alimony. Providers sub-
mitted both types of payments through a Support Bureau.193 Still, 
if a poor person did not seek support, a charitable association or 
public official retained the right, inspired by the poor law, to file 
on the person’s behalf to protect taxpayers.194 
The statute also included a dramatic change in the options 
available to enforce men’s support duties. While retaining the 
criminal nonsupport option, the law additionally permitted 
judges to enter support orders following civil proceedings. More-
over, judges had the authority to transform matters initially des-
ignated as civil into criminal actions or vice versa whenever they 
believed doing so would be advantageous.195 State-level criminal 
procedure protections—such as the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses—remained obligatory only when the court proceeded un-
der the law denominated “criminal.”196 This gave judges signifi-
cant discretion. In the words of a New York lawyer reviewing the 
changes, the 1933 law sought “to create elasticity of procedure 
and punishment.”197 
Crucially, the court could use incarceration and probation un-
der both the civil and criminal paths. If a person failed to comply 
with a civil support order, the court could “commit [him] to jail for 
a term not to exceed twelve months,”198 in other words for con-
tempt of court. Or, it could find a defendant “guilty of non- 
support” and “punish [him] by imprisonment in jail for not ex-
ceeding twelve months.”199 Under both options, the court retained 
the discretion to release the person early on probation in further-
ance of “the best interests of the family and the community.”200 
This meant the court’s contempt power and criminal sentencing 
power were virtually identical to each other and to previous  
 
 193 Annual Report of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York 62 (1933). 
 194 Lewis, 5 NY St Bar Assn Bull at 491 (cited in note 190). 
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1282 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1241 
 
practice. As one supporter trumpeted, the court could “deal with 
recalcitrant persons as heretofore.”201 
Although the text of the Domestic Relations Court Act did not 
state that the new tribunal was “civil,” officials and observers un-
derstood it as such. In the language of the court’s first annual re-
port: “The most outstanding change is the fundamental shift in 
the character of jurisdiction from criminal to civil.” 202  Adjust-
ments to vocabulary added to the civil veneer; for instance, “re-
spondent” replaced “defendant.”203 
Proponents and court staff recognized and welcomed the stra-
tegic reinforcement of so-called civil law with retained criminal 
powers. In explanatory publicity materials, social welfare leaders 
who had helped draft the law cast their blending of civil and crim-
inal components as “novel and [i]ngenious.” The legislation re-
moved the family court from the criminal system and rendered its 
procedure “almost entirely a Civil One,” a pamphlet explained. 
Yet “[w]hile the procedure in future will be chiefly civil,” it con-
tinued, 
the Power to Proceed under Criminal Procedure is Retained 
as it must be—for, on last analysis, if a husband refuses to 
obey the orders of the court to support his wife, the only ef-
fective way of dealing with him is to send him to jail. To im-
pose a civil judgment upon him that is uncollectible is an 
empty gesture.204 
 In short, the new court design deliberately blended civil and 
criminal components in a manner far more explicit and strategic 
than any previous family tribunal had done. State involvement—
primarily through probation oversight, centralized collection and 
disbursement of payments, and the threat or reality of incarcera-
tion—was now a key ingredient in civil support enforcement. The 
criminal-laced civil machinery nearly eliminated incentives to 
turn to criminal law. Detailed statistical analyses published in 
the court’s annual reports in the following years provided no in-
dication that any cases were pursued as “criminal,” even as the 
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court used warrants, probation, and incarceration.205 A decade 
into the court’s operation, one of its judges explained to employees 
that though the court was “deemed to be essentially a court of 
civil jurisdiction,” it “savors of the criminal law.”206 
The first New York Court of Appeals case probing the civil-
criminal blend offered almost no discussion, deferring to the leg-
islature’s removal of such cases from the criminal court system as 
dispositive evidence of civil character. After acknowledging “there 
seemed to be some confusion” about whether certain proceedings 
under the Domestic Relations Court Act were civil or criminal, 
the court held: “We now say that these proceedings are no longer 
of a criminal nature as they have shifted to the civil side of the 
courts.”207 
New York’s strategic melding of civil and criminal compo-
nents became influential.208 In 1943, the NPA praised New York 
City as having “among the most progressive” and “best non- 
support laws in the country.”209 Reflecting this view, a Miami fam-
ily court judge speaking at an NPA conference the following year 
suggested that “[t]he best thought seems to favor making such 
courts civil in nature” in order to “escape from the technicalities 
of criminal courts.” Civil contempt offered these courts speed and 
other procedural advantages, he observed, yet the courts should 
retain criminal powers to use when civil methods failed.210 In 
1949, the NPA credited and followed New York’s approach when 
crafting a model nonsupport law.211 
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The legislature in Turner’s home state of South Carolina was 
among those persuaded. In 1935, Charleston followed New York 
City when it became the first city in its state to open a domestic 
relations court.212 Unsurprisingly, South Carolinian judges found 
that the option to “enforce its decrees by punishment for con-
tempt”213 reduced their need to turn to the state’s preexisting mis-
demeanor statute.214 A South Carolina domestic relations judge 
captured this perspective when he opined in the 1950s:  
“Contempt is my favorite weapon.”215 
B. A Civil Alternative to Extradition 
Though the relabeling of criminal nonsupport as civil solved 
some problems, a substantial weakness remained: how to effi-
ciently handle desertion across state lines. Because the criminal 
laws enacted in earlier decades were not repealed, extradition re-
mained available. In practice, however, the cost undermined the 
utility. As one family court judge observed in a speech to the NPA 
in 1942, the expense of pursuing “such a fugitive is frequently 
greater than the amount to be collected.” 216  Similarly, the  
Brooklyn District Attorney estimated that it would cost $600,000 
per year to extradite all deserting husbands, whereas the entire 
annual extradition budget was between $5,000 and $6,000. Ex-
tradition might be a complete waste, as there was no guarantee 
the men would then support their dependents.217 
Extradition was also legally complex. Questions arose about 
whether a man was a “fugitive from justice,” as required for the 
Extradition Clause to apply, if he left his wife for a legitimate, 
temporary reason (such as looking for work) and only later de-
cided not to return to her.218 Finally, nonsupport cases became 
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tied up in broader disputes about whether extradition was  
discretionary.219 
In 1941, Grace Clyde Seaman, the Assistant District Attor-
ney responsible for the Abandonment Bureau in Brooklyn, turned 
her attention to finding an alternative to extradition. She first 
proposed a federal criminal law, which she envisioned would be 
heard in children’s divisions within federal courts.220 After several 
years of publicizing this approach to no avail, Seaman and her 
colleagues developed a new idea: civil reciprocal laws enforced in 
family courts.221 For a civil suit to be pursuable when litigants 
were in different states, the legislature needed to expressly pro-
vide this jurisdiction to the family court. Moreover, to be worth-
while, states needed to agree in advance that they would  
cooperate regardless of whether their own court had jurisdiction 
over the provider or the dependents. Passage of compatible recip-
rocal enforcement laws could achieve this goal.222 
The New York legislature led the effort to create a reciprocal 
enforcement web when it passed such legislation in 1948. This 
early iteration was tacked onto the 1933 Domestic Relations 
Court Act but, recognizing that this approach made it difficult for 
other states to copy and thereby impeded reciprocity, the legisla-
ture repealed and replaced it with a standalone act the next year: 
the Uniform Support of Dependents Law (USDL).223 The USDL 
adopted core parts of the Domestic Relations Court Act—such as 
judicial discretion to award “a fair and reasonable sum,” the in-
volvement of a state attorney to represent the dependent, and 
oversight by probation officers. The essential provision provided 
that the family court could now apply the law when a petitioner, 
respondent, or both were in the state. Although the USDL did not 
carry over the Domestic Relations Court Act’s option of trans-
forming civil suits into criminal petitions (likely because experi-
ence showed reverting to criminal law was rarely necessary), it 
provided that a respondent who willfully failed to comply with a 
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court order or probation should be punished in the same manner 
as for noncompliance in other cases.224 For many states, this in-
cluded civil contempt imprisonment. Thus, the USDL maintained 
the probation surveillance and incarceration powers of earlier 
criminal nonsupport laws but within a civil framing. Moreover, 
the statute clarified it was “an additional or alternative civil rem-
edy” that should not “affect or impair any other remedy, civil or 
criminal.”225 
New York’s civil reciprocal law received nationwide atten-
tion, including from the Council of State Governments, and was 
soon adopted in other states.226 As more states joined, the law 
gained momentum with the promise of wider reciprocity. In con-
trast to the options that predated criminalization, the USDL pro-
vided a strong and procedurally clear mechanism for interstate 
enforcement.227 
Meanwhile, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had 
begun reevaluating the Uniform Act of 1910, prompted, by their 
own account, by an article published in Cosmopolitan Magazine 
in 1942.228 The Commissioners recognized that no state had en-
acted the Uniform Act for decades and that adopting states had 
modified it beyond the point of it actually providing uniformity. 
Thus, the Commissioners considered how to revise the law to fit 
new circumstances and to settle lingering questions about ap-
plicability to dependents not likely to become public charges. 
They suggested “the better view” was that the criminal statutes 
should “supplement civil remedies against the husband or  
father.”229 
The Commissioners’ discussions in the following years reveal 
that they still conceived of the solution to interstate enforcement 
as coming from criminal law. They were deeply troubled, how-
ever, by the application of criminal law to mid-century families. 
While their 1910 predecessors envisioned that extradition would 
bring a husband back to a home in which he previously lived with 
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his wife and possibly lead to a reconciliation, the Commissioners 
of the 1940s thought extradition meant removing a man from a 
good job and sending him to a state where he perhaps never lived. 
The wife could, one discussant worried, “go to any one of the forty-
seven states that she chooses, and make that man a criminal in 
the state of her choice.”230 Aside from providing too much power 
to the wife, they thought this scenario might not pass constitu-
tional muster. Furthermore, once in the wife’s state, the man 
would be imprisoned at public expense, helping no one. But if the 
Commissioners instead created a framework in which a man was 
prosecuted wherever he was located, that setup incentivized him 
to forum shop for the state with the weakest law. Unable to iden-
tify a clear path forward, they cycled through several drafts.231 
By their 1949 meeting, the Commissioners had learned about 
the USDL, which had already been passed in twelve states, rais-
ing their interest in a law that included civil enforcement compo-
nents, too.232 In 1950, the Commissioners released the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).233 URESA con-
tained both criminal and civil machinery to facilitate enforcement 
of substantive laws already on the books in adopting states (in 
contrast to the USDL, which included both substantive law and 
reciprocity). 
The Criminal Enforcement section of URESA was brief and 
focused on easing extradition by outlining the requirements and 
procedures. The most innovative provision permitted extradition 
of a person who was not a fugitive from justice, thus extending 
extradition to more scenarios than required under the Constitu-
tion’s Extradition Clause and requiring proof on fewer points.234 
As the most prominent promoter of URESA later explained, the 
drafters retained the criminal approach because they were  
uncertain whether civil suits would cover all situations, and they 
anticipated that “the threat of extradition might be a powerful 
weapon in the case of shiftless and slippery obligors.”235 
 
 230 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole: Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act 
16–17 (Sept 2, 1948). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole: Model Reciprocal Non-Support Act and/or 
Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act (Aug 31, 1949). 
 233 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole: Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act (Sept 12, 1950). 
 234 Id at 4–5. 
 235 William J. Brockelbank, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support (The Runaway 
Pappy Act) 15, 21 (Bobbs-Merrill 1960) (emphasis in original). 
1288 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1241 
 
URESA’s Civil Enforcement portion was far lengthier, cover-
ing complex choice of law issues and detailed procedural prescrip-
tions. The URESA framework imposed duties on both initiating 
and responding states to exchange paperwork; hold appropriate 
hearings; and accept, track, and transmit payment. The court 
with jurisdiction over the obligor could require the person to make 
regular payments to a clerk or probation department and to re-
port to the same regularly. URESA also allowed states or locali-
ties to pursue reimbursement of expenditures made on behalf of 
a dependent. Punishment for noncompliance followed ordinary 
rules for contempt of court, which could include incarceration.236 
 All forty-eight states and several US territories adopted ei-
ther URESA or USDL (which were interchangeable for purposes 
of states being able to cooperate with each other) by 1955, greatly 
boosting recovery of support under civil law approaches.237 Civil 
law now seemed clearly superior to criminal law in most situa-
tions. A representative newspaper article summed up the benefits 
of the civil reciprocal regime: “No criminal action, no extradition, 
no loss of job.”238 Several cities reported upturns in the number of 
cases and amount collected.239 New York City’s Domestic Rela-
tions Court recorded a major increase, attributed to the reciprocal 
laws, from $473,468 in 1953 to $747,346 in 1954.240 
Heightened collections helped justify the costs associated 
with running the civil reciprocal system. The Assistant US Attor-
ney responsible for these matters for DC expected that URESA 
would permit him to handle around 90 percent of nonsupport 
cases as more “efficient” civil matters. Though he estimated the 
larger caseload would require ten people, he reasoned that “the 
cost of staff to handle the cases might be balanced” by reducing 
welfare rolls.241 In this way, the public purpose of support enforce-
ment validated the retention of prosecutorial involvement within 
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a so-called civil scheme.242 Aiding the prosecutorial staff, courts 
repurposed probation officers as filers of contempt petitions.243 
After all states had passed reciprocal laws, an account cele-
brated how cooperation under civil law “left runaway fathers with 
no place to hide,” yet offered the option of jail when needed. “While 
desertion is a crime in every State, the machinery for extraditing 
and trying a runaway father on criminal charges is cumbersome 
and rarely invoked,” the article explained. “The great advantage of 
the new system is that it operates under civil, rather than criminal, 
procedures.”244 Similarly, a family law expert at Columbia Law 
School observed that civil interstate enforcement had, by 1953, “al-
ready made the felony proceeding (abandonment) virtually obso-
lete.”245 These developments likely help explain the turn to the 
more civil-sounding terminology “child support,” which entered the 
lexicon in 1939, grew dramatically in the 1950s, and surpassed 
“nonsupport” by around 1960.246 
A series of legal attacks on USDL’s and URESA’s inter- 
mingling of civil and criminal components failed. In the first 
USDL case to reach a state supreme court, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court upheld the propriety of using public funds to pay 
prosecutors to represent wives in “private lawsuits” for civil sup-
port because it saw “no apparent reason” to distinguish these 
suits from analogous criminal cases. Both types of proceedings, 
the court reasoned, shared the same objective: “to coerce the hus-
band or father to comply with an obligation which otherwise 
would fall on the public generally.”247 In other words, the public 
purpose justified reliance on criminal-style personnel, even when 
the proceedings were “civil.” After a series of legislative refine-
ments and court cases, states reached uniformity in providing the 
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assistance of a state attorney “closely akin to the prosecuting at-
torney,” regardless of whether the beneficiary parent and child 
received public assistance.248 Judges justified this result on the 
basis that “[t]he collection of child support ultimately benefits the 
State,” even when it is disbursed to a private party.249 
Despite recognizing parallels between the civil and criminal 
suits, courts hearing USDL and URESA appeals relied on the 
civil label to dismiss men’s procedural objections. Judges denied 
claims that defendants had constitutional rights to receive jury 
trials and to confront witnesses against them.250 In 1956, the New 
York Court of Appeals characterized reciprocal support  
statutes as “quasi-criminal in nature” but held criminal Due Pro-
cess inapplicable on the basis that the proceedings were held in 
“civil court” and did not apply fines or penalties (instead relying on 
contempt). The US Supreme Court summarily dismissed the case 
“for want of a substantial federal question.”251 Thus, under the re-
ciprocal statutes, defendants faced state personnel and powers 
typical of the criminal context, but without criminal procedure 
protections. 
While reciprocal statutes improved civil enforcement, observ-
ers still recognized value in maintaining criminal law. The most 
prominent group to express this view was the American Law In-
stitute, which met beginning in 1956 to draft the Model Penal 
Code (MPC), with the goal of standardizing and modernizing 
state laws.252 In an outline of the issues the drafters faced, they 
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included: “Is it justifiable to preserve criminal non-support, de-
spite general belief that civil (and social service-type) proceedings 
are preferable, in order to keep the prosecutors in the business as 
legal aid for indigent wives?”253 While the question oversimplified 
the purpose and consequences of criminal nonsupport laws, it 
captured a key component. Criminal law brought state employee 
assistance to wives who could not afford lawyers. 
The MPC drafters concluded that “ideally” nonsupport would 
be pursued as a civil matter but that there were “important rea-
sons” not to abandon the criminal option. First, criminal law in-
volved prosecutors in the process. “While this is not a desirable 
role for prosecutors in commercial transactions,” they acknowl-
edged, “it may be very important” for indigent dependents living 
far from legal aid offices. Second, criminal law provided extradi-
tion, although URESA made this less necessary. And finally, 
criminal law contributed deterrence. They speculated that the ex-
istence of criminal law could both sway individual men’s decisions 
and “reinforc[e] the moral disapproval” attached to nonsupport.254 
The blended civil-criminal approach was further bolstered by 
federal law. Congress had long resisted reformers’ attempts to 
draw the federal government into family support enforcement255 
and had even caused DC to be the last jurisdiction to adopt a re-
ciprocal law.256 Yet in the 1950s, Congress slowly began cooperat-
ing in the development of a complex federal-state partnership to 
collect child support.257 Three elements are most relevant in this 
decades-long collaboration. First, the federal government intro-
duced or helped spread novel techniques to coerce enforcement, 
such as revoking professional, occupational, recreational, and 
drivers’ licenses; denying passport applications; and intercepting 
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federal tax refunds.258 Second, Congress added a federal criminal 
law in 1992, which applies when a parent fails to pay an amount 
greater than $5,000 over state lines for a year. 259  And third,  
Congress bolstered interstate enforcement by changing federal 
law and by using its spending power to incentivize states to adopt 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a modified 
version of URESA.260 Overall, federalization made support en-
forcement more frequent and effective, in large part by refining 
and enhancing the blended civil-criminal machinery invented by 
states.261 Ironically, the federal involvement reformers sought un-
successfully for so many years now prevents the meaningful ex-
perimentation at the local and state levels that identified the 
practices federal law enshrined. 
C. The Shift to “Civil” Family Courts 
As states refined their civil support options, rendering crimi-
nal law more a background threat, family courts appeared pri-
marily or exclusively “civil.” Some locations broadened or re-
placed existing family courts to include civil nonsupport matters 
through legislative change or judicial interpretation,262 while oth-
ers included these laws in creating specialized courts for the first 
time.263 When constitutional requirements made combining civil 
and criminal jurisdiction difficult, lawmakers included only the 
civil cases.264 It was unnecessary to retain criminal nonsupport in 
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reformed family courts, one expert reasoned, because “the use of 
the criminal law approach is all but disappearing.” And, in the 
new civil-dominant scheme, it would be beneficial to exclude crim-
inal matters. “We want to do our best to keep out the penal law 
atmosphere,” the expert explained, “with all the formal trappings 
of jury trials and the rest.”265 
Another influential shift was the transfer of divorce litiga-
tion. Attention to the treatment of divorce overflowed in the wake 
of a post–World War II divorce wave, which merged with ongoing 
concerns about the fraud and collusion used to satisfy fault 
grounds.266 Pointing to juvenile courts (still more common and un-
controversial than adult-focused domestic relations courts) or re-
visiting the NPA’s proposal for unified family courts, legal leaders 
proposed family courts with divorce jurisdiction.267 Though con-
tinuing to encounter pushback,268 this time they met with more 
success in moving divorce to family courts.269 By 1960, divorce al-
most fully eclipsed criminal nonsupport as the primary motiva-
tion for promoting family courts.270 
Meanwhile, probation officers slowly disappeared from mari-
tal litigation. Some latecomers to probation never applied the 
method to family cases, while others phased it out for budgetary 
reasons.271 Probation officer functions were curtailed, with the re-
habilitative goals and methods eliminated. A 1953 memorandum 
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prepared by a social work leader, who was serving as director of 
a juvenile delinquency project for the US Children’s Bureau, cap-
tures some of the reasoning behind these changes: 
It appears to me that non-support is a civil action. How can 
a person be placed on probation as the result of a civil action? 
. . . [P]robation officers are now used primarily to insure pay-
ment. This is a great waste of money and skill. We could use 
a less expensive and less qualified type of personnel to do this 
work.272 
Following this logic, support collection and disbursement were in-
creasingly handled by court bureaucrats who only oversaw pay-
ments, rather than providing rehabilitative treatment.273 (For ex-
ample, a family court clerk initiated the hearing that culminated 
in Turner’s incarceration. The clerk’s duties included reviewing 
delinquent accounts and issuing “show cause” orders for those 
more than five days behind, regardless of whether the arrears 
were due to a private party or the state.274) 
In 1959, the NPA endorsed flexibility in family court em-
ployee titles, apparently not perceiving this move as a threat to 
probation employment or else joining a foregone conclusion. In its 
modified model Family Court Act, the NPA explained that it used 
the vague word “assistants,” rather than “probation officer[s],” to 
“permit[ ] each court to adopt a title that seems most appropri-
ate.”275 The result was that court positions were filled by officials 
who did not have training or professional identities as probation 
officers.276 Some probation tasks fell by the wayside, and others 
were outsourced. Family courts could refer litigants to therapists, 
for instance.277 And lawyers jumped in to fill other gaps, such as 
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representing children’s interests in divorce and custody disputes 
in the much-troubled role of guardian ad litem.278 Though some 
locations retain probation officers for criminal nonsupport mat-
ters to this day, these cases are such a tiny portion of litigation 
that probation is hardly noticeable in modern family courts.279 
Once divorce and civil nonsupport took over family court 
dockets, and probation receded to the background, the courts 
seemed civil, even though many used criminal-style interventions 
in so-called civil matters and maintained actual jurisdiction over 
criminal nonsupport. This transition obscured the criminal ori-
gins of family courts and the laws they apply.280 
IV.  CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL 
DIVIDE 
That child support enforcement machinery is criminal law in 
a civil guise has serious implications as a matter of principle and 
practice. 281  There is widespread agreement that modern child 
support enforcement is flawed.282 Scholars have raised important 
questions about the financial usefulness and collateral conse-
quences of incarcerating child support debtors.283 Careful studies 
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L & Pub Pol 179 (2017). 
 279 See, for example, The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court *2, 9  
(Virginia’s Judicial System), archived at http://perma.cc/5Z7U-A4HU. 
 280 See, for example, Nadine Mason, Hubbub Marks Court of Domestic Relations, LA 
Times 16 (Jan 4, 1960). 
 281 For a helpful overview of the current operation of the law, published in the late 
stages of completing this Article, see generally Cortney Lollar, Criminalizing (Poor)  
Fatherhood, 70 Ala L Rev 125 (2018). 
 282 See, for example, Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement  
Policy for Poor Families, 45 Fam L Q 157, 161 (2011); Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate Jr, 
and Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong, “I Do for My Kids”: Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in 
Family Court, 83 Fordham L Rev 3027, 3036–44 (2015). 
 283 See Part IV.A. One of the earliest notable entrants in this discussion was Professor 
David Chambers, who relied on empirical evidence from Michigan to argue that jail, as 
part of “[a]n aggressive enforcement system,” measurably increased support enforcement. 
Despite this finding, Chambers questioned whether jail was a wise tactic because he 
thought it could harm family relationships, looked like imprisonment for debt, and seemed 
inappropriate for an intrafamily offense that disproportionately implicated poor and alco-
holic fathers. David L. Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and 
Costs of Jailing for Nonpayment of Support, 75 Mich L Rev 900, 927–34 (1977). See gen-
erally David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Support  
(Chicago 1979). Chambers’s work was recognized at the time as informative, but many 
disagreed with his normative conclusions, including on feminist grounds. See, for example, 
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have concluded that the Turner v Rogers majority’s provision of 
“alternative procedural safeguards”284 has done little to protect in-
digent obligors.285 For these reasons, a new reform approach may 
be warranted, yet securing change through the political process 
has proven difficult.286 
One possible path forward could be to return to the Court to 
seek a holding that modern child support enforcement is of a crim-
inal nature. Given the Turner majority’s limitations on the scope 
of its holding, there will likely be a Turner sequel.287 And the 
Court previously expressed willingness to look beneath the civil 
contempt label in the child support context.288 The proposal to 
seek a criminal classification is admittedly somewhat unsatisfy-
ing, coming after this Article has demonstrated that the civil-
criminal line is artificial and malleable. While recognizing this 
disjunction, the discussion proceeds from the premise that the 
criminal label is too entrenched in constitutional law to discard. 
 
Robert Mnookin, Book Review, Review: Using Jail for Child Support Enforcement,  
48 U Chi L Rev 338, 369 (1981) (stating that Chambers weighed interests of single women 
and their children “less heavily in his arguments than I would”). Interestingly, more re-
cent feminist scholarship sometimes echoes Chambers in questioning the use of criminal 
law and imprisonment. For discussion, see generally Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on 
Crime, 92 Iowa L Rev 741 (2007). 
 284 The Court required that states better ensure “adequate notice of the importance 
of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and 
court findings.” Turner, 564 US at 448. 
 285 See generally Elizabeth G. Patterson, Turner in the Trenches: A Study of How 
Turner v. Rogers Affected Child Support Contempt Proceedings, 25 Georgetown J Poverty 
L & Pol 75 (2017); Ashley Robertson, Note, Revisiting Turner v. Rogers, 69 Stan L Rev 
1541 (2017). See also Margaret Brining and Marsha Garrison, Getting Blood from Stones: 
Results and Policy Implications of an Empirical Investigation of Child Support Practice in 
St. Joseph County, Indiana Paternity Actions, 56 Fam Ct Rev 521, 533 (2018) (finding 
routine use of contempt and concluding Turner “had no apparent impact on local contempt 
practice”). 
 286 See Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 669–71 (cited in note 14) (discussing insti-
tutional and political resistance to change in this context). It remains to be seen whether 
guidelines passed by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement in 2017 will result 
in real changes. On these guidelines, see Patterson, 25 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 
109–10 (cited in note 285); Brining and Garrison, 56 Fam Ct Rev at 524 (cited in note 285). 
 287 Turner, 564 US at 449 (different result may follow if custodial parent has a lawyer, 
in “unusually complex” cases, or “where the underlying child support payment is owed to 
the State”). 
 288 In a child support contempt case that turned on the civil-criminal line to determine 
whether a statutory presumption (that the parent remained able to comply with a support 
order) was unconstitutional, the Court held that a “substantiated” challenge could defeat 
“the labels affixed either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed under state law.” How-
ever, it remanded the case for further proceedings on that point. Hicks v Feiock, 485 US 
624, 631 (1988). The lower court then concluded that the contempt proceeding was crimi-
nal because the defendant was subject to a probationary term he could not end early 
through compliance. In re Feiock, 215 Cal App 3d 141 (1990). 
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It is uncertain how the Court would treat the argument that 
proceedings like those in Turner should be classified as criminal. 
Scholars have roundly condemned the Court for failing to develop 
a principled approach to analyzing statutes that defy easy civil-
criminal labeling. Discussants have responded by offering alter-
native tests, yet none of the proposals has secured the Court’s en-
dorsement or a scholarly consensus.289 The history of child sup-
port enforcement provides a fresh and novel basis to reconsider 
the Court’s current test and suggest improvements.290 
If the Court were persuaded to categorize child support pro-
ceedings like Turner’s as criminal, state lawmakers would need 
to change either procedures or punishments to align with consti-
tutional constraints. Because of the particularly counter- 
productive consequences of incarcerating parents who owe child 
support, the better approach would be to decriminalize most child 
support proceedings through elimination of incarceration.291 
A. Criminal-Derived Enforcement Methods Post-Turner 
Though the full scope of incarceration for child support non-
payment is unknown, studies suggest that thousands of debtor 
fathers have suffered this consequence.292 Some states’ jail popu-
lations include large contingents of these men.293 Most of these in-
carcerations follow civil contempt proceedings, rather than crim-
inal prosecutions.294 Family law scholars and sociologists have 
pointed to the demographic characteristics of child support debt-
ors and other factors to argue that it is unrealistic for some par-
ents to comply with support orders, especially after debts begin to 
 
 289 See Steiker, 85 Georgetown L J at 809–20 (cited in note 30) (outlining three main 
approaches pursued by other scholars: following legislative labels, developing a middle 
ground jurisprudence, or crafting a test to identify a meaningful civil-criminal line). 
 290 See Part IV.B. The Part’s proposals could improve analysis in other contexts in-
volving “civil” confinement, such as in sex offender cases like Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 
346, 361–62 (1997). For helpful criticism of the Court’s current analysis in this context, 
see generally Arielle W. Tolman, Note, Sex Offender Civil Commitment to Prison Post-
Kingsley, 113 Nw U L Rev 155 (2018). 
 291 See Part IV.C. 
 292 Elizabeth Cozzolino, Public Assistance, Relationship Context, and Jail for Child 
Support Debt, 4 Socius 1, 2 (2018). 
 293 Id. 
 294 Patterson, 25 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 80 (cited in note 285) (around 
15 percent of South Carolina’s jail population was being held for child support contempt). 
See also Lynne Haney, Incarcerated Fatherhood: The Entanglements of Child Support 
Debt and Mass Imprisonment, 124 Am J Soc 1, 28 (2018); Zatz, 39 Seattle U L Rev at 933 
(cited in note 15); Cozzolino, 4 Socius at 13 (cited in note 292). 
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accrue fees and interest.295 Most child support debtors live below 
the poverty line, and parents who earn less than $10,000 per year 
owe 70 percent of arrears.296 
Before resorting to civil contempt incarceration, family courts 
employ a wide range of coercive techniques, some of which require 
the involvement of state and federal employees and resources in 
a manner that far exceeds court involvement in typical “civil” 
matters. One of the most common methods is garnishment of 
wages, which can withhold up to 65 percent of fathers’ salaries.297 
For men without steady incomes, this method is ineffectual. 
Other possibilities include interception of tax refunds, revocation 
of drivers’ licenses and occupational licenses, and denial of pass-
ports.298 Some sanctions apply automatically when debt reaches a 
predetermined level. As just one example, Florida suspends child 
support debtors’ drivers’ licenses when they owe $400.299 
Whether these coercive methods are productive, or at least 
worth the cost of implementation, is unclear. One study found 
that sanctions “account for only 4% of child support collections.”300 
Another suggested that “probably less than 2% of child support 
collections can be associated with the threat of incarceration.”301 
Reform proponents suggest that enforcement reduces fathers’ in-
formal contributions of cash and in-kind support by more than the 
enforcement secures.302 They also claim that the current approach 
harms relationships between parents and discourages visits with 
children.303 Child support obligors with extreme debt may turn to 
 
 295 For example, Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 617 (cited in note 14); Cammett, 
Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 142–50 (cited in note 15); Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & 
Pub Pol at 107–14 (cited in note 3); Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 18 (cited in note 294); Maria 
Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, and Eunhee Han, Child Support: Responsible Fatherhood and 
the Quid Pro Quo, 635 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 140, 152 (2011). 
 296 Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 118 (cited in note 3). 
 297 Cammett, Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 144 (cited in note 15). 
 298 Id at 130, 144–45; Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 100–01 (cited in note 3). 
 299 Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 27 (cited in note 294); Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as 
Fathers: The Courts, the Law and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 Cardozo L 
Rev 511, 531–34 (2013). 
 300 Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 27 (cited in note 294). See also Cancian, Meyer, and Han, 
635 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 149 (cited in note 295) (collecting studies finding 
sanctions such as loss of drivers’ license counterproductive). 
 301 Carmen Solomon-Fears, Alison M. Smith, and Carla Berry, Child Support  
Enforcement: Incarceration as the Last Resort Penalty for Nonpayment of Support 3 (2012) 
(this statistic seems to include both criminal and civil methods of incarceration). 
 302 Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 657 (cited in note 14). 
 303 Cammett, Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 130, 144–45 (cited in note 15);  
Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 97 (cited in note 3). 
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the underground economy or pursue illegal sources of income.304 
Jailed fathers obviously earn little to no income.305 However, it is 
unknown what deterrent effect these sanctions may hold for other 
obligor parents.  
The state and federal governments have direct financial 
stakes or foreseeable interests in the outcome of many support 
cases because of connections between support enforcement and 
welfare benefits. When a custodial parent applies for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or other government as-
sistance, the state automatically opens a child support case 
against the noncustodial parent to seek reimbursement for these 
costs. Many men’s support payments go entirely toward reim-
bursing the government for these benefits.306 According to one 
scholar: “About half of the child support caseload consists of fam-
ilies with histories of current (10 percent) or prior (40 percent) 
welfare receipt.”307 Between 20 and 25 percent of the more than 
$100 billion in child support arrears is due to the government.308 
All states and the federal government also maintain full-
fledged criminal nonsupport laws.309 These laws provide sanctions 
similar or even identical to those authorized in family court civil 
contempt statutes,310 yet they rarely serve as the basis for child 
support incarceration. 311  The selective application of criminal 
 
 304 Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 29 (cited in note 294). 
 305 Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 658–59 (cited in note 14).  
 306 Cozzolino, 4 Socius at 4 (cited in note 292); Cammett, Georgetown J Poverty L & 
Pol at 129 (cited in note 15). 
 307 Cozzolino, 4 Socius at 3 (cited in note 292). 
 308 See id; Who Owes Child Support Debt? (Office of Child Support Enforcement, Sept 15, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/9Z8V-QDMF. The Turner majority cited a statistic from 2004 
that around half of arrears are owed to the government. Turner, 564 US at 446–47. 
 309 On the retention of criminal law, see Part III.B. For a list of current statutes, see 
Criminal Nonsupport and Child Support (National Conference of State Legislatures, June 
6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9ZJQ-8BCK. 
 310 For instance, South Carolina’s criminal nonsupport statute and family court civil 
contempt statute both provide for incarceration for up to a year and a fine of $1,500 
(though only the contempt statute allows a public works sentence of up to three hundred 
hours). Compare SC Code Ann § 63-5-20, with SC Code Ann § 63-3-620. 
 311 Brief of Center for Family Policy and Practice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pe-
titioner, Turner v Rogers, No 10-10, *21–22 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw 
at 2011 WL 141222); Steven Cook and Jennifer L. Noyes, The Use of Civil Contempt and 
Criminal Nonsupport as Child Enforcement Tools: A Report on Local Perspectives and the 
Availability of Data *12–13 (University of Wisconsin-Madison, May 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8SU3-WSR7. 
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laws renders them a valuable tool in the child support enforce-
ment arsenal.312 These laws provide a criminal backbone—deter-
rence, stigma, extradition, and the possibility of criminal convic-
tion—to the purported civil scheme. 
The government’s civil and criminal coercive tools are not 
limited to those cases in which it is the direct beneficiary.313 Ra-
ther, the longstanding entanglement of public and private goals 
in securing family support has justified substantial overlap in the 
enforcement options for “private” and “public” cases.314 The in-
volvement of family court staff and routine use of contempt incar-
ceration, backed by the selective use of nonsupport laws labeled 
criminal, raises weighty questions about the nature of modern 
child support law for purposes of assigning procedural  
protections. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Civil-Criminal 
Divide 
The opinions in Turner began from the unquestioned premise 
that the defendant was subject to incarceration for civil contempt, 
thus not qualifying for the significant protections required in 
criminal prosecutions or even the lesser procedures guaranteed 
for criminal contempt hearings. When the Court revisits child 
support enforcement, it could instead start by asking whether 
such enforcement is civil or criminal. A criminal label matters not 
only for the right to counsel but also for the burden of proof and 
persuasion, the rights to a jury trial and against self- 
incrimination, and myriad other reasons.315 
There are two paths the Court’s civil-versus-criminal analy-
sis is most likely to take: a narrow focus on contempt or a broader 
test that the Court has employed when evaluating the nature of 
 
 312 See Teresa A. Myers, Courts Uphold Criminal Penalties for Failure to Pay Child 
Support (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2008), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6V4H-PL7Y; Solomon-Fears, Smith, and Berry, Child Support Enforce-
ment at 11 (cited in note 301). 
 313 Stacy Brustin and Lisa Martin, Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law: Repur-
posing Federal IV-D Funding to Expand Community-Based Legal and Social Services for 
Parents, 67 Hastings L J 1265, 1268 (2016). 
 314 Cancian, Meyer, and Han, 635 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 144 (cited in 
note 295). See also Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1044 (cited in note 29) (explaining 
how public and private child support “are now administered under one heavily regulated, 
government-run system”). 
 315 See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 Georgetown L J 1, 3–4 (2005). 
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a sanction. Scholars have identified weaknesses in both ap-
proaches.316 Consideration of how the Court’s analyses apply to 
child support enforcement affirms previous critiques, finds addi-
tional reasons for skepticism, and identifies factors that may be 
useful for future cases. 
Beginning with the contempt-precedent approach, the Court 
has long recognized that “[c]ontempts are neither wholly civil nor 
altogether criminal.” 317  Nevertheless, contempt is typically di-
vided into criminal and civil classes, with the distinction turning 
on the reason for the sanction. Criminal contempt imposes a fine 
or imprisonment as a punitive measure “to vindicate the authority 
of the law.” By contrast, in civil contempt the incarceration is for 
a remedial purpose—to coerce the offender into complying with a 
court order “for the benefit of the complainant.” In civil contempt, 
therefore, the person is released upon compliance; in the common 
phrasing, the contemnor “carries the keys of his prison in his own 
pockets.”318 
The contempt evaluation is more complicated when it in-
volves failure to comply with a court order to pay a specified 
amount.319 In those cases the “ability to pay . . . marks a dividing 
line between civil and criminal contempt.”320 This is because if the 
person is unable to pay, contempt incarceration is ineffective at 
coercion and thus cannot be cast as remedial. The Turner major-
ity recognized the distinction between civil and criminal contempt 
for nonpayment but only for the purpose of discussing whether 
Turner needed a lawyer to assure “accurate decisionmaking in re-
spect to the key ‘ability to pay’ question.” The justices emphasized 
that “accuracy” regarding ability to pay was particularly im-
portant here because it marked the difference between civil and 
criminal contempt. They explained: “That is because an incorrect 
decision (wrongly classifying the contempt proceeding as civil) 
can increase the risk of wrongful incarceration by depriving the 
 
 316 For a critique of the broader test, see, for example, id. On the unsatisfactory dis-
tinction between civil and criminal contempt, see Earl C. Dudley Jr, Getting beyond the 
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 
Va L Rev 1025 (1993). 
 317 Gompers v Bucks Stove & Range Co, 221 US 418, 441 (1911). 
 318 Id at 441–42. See also Dudley, 79 Va L Rev at 1025 (cited in note 316). 
 319 Relatedly, the ABA’s Turner amicus brief argued that indigent defendants facing 
incarceration for contempt warranted counsel “regardless of whether the proceeding is 
labeled ‘civil’ or criminal’” and described contempt for child support as a “quasi-criminal.” 
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, Turner v Rog-
ers, No 10-10, *5–7 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 118266). 
 320 Turner, 564 US at 445 (quotation marks omitted), citing Hicks, 485 US at 635 n 7. 
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defendant of the procedural protections (including counsel) that 
the Constitution would demand in a criminal proceeding.”321 Un-
der this reasoning, the defendant’s financial situation dictates 
whether he faces civil or criminal contempt, which determines 
whether he gets appointed counsel, who might have been helpful 
in navigating the initial civil-criminal contempt question. This 
scenario demonstrates how poorly the contempt precedent, which 
was largely crafted on other fact patterns (for example, deliberate 
disturbance of a trial or insult to a judge),322 fits a failure-to-pay 
situation.323 
The contempt analysis is even more ill-fitting when applied 
to indigent debtors. Few situations arise in which a person the 
Court classifies as “indigent” (as they did Turner) could be held 
liable for contempt for nonpayment. Though some people who are 
indigent for purposes of qualifying for appointed counsel might be 
able to afford their child support arrears, an unknown but proba-
bly significant portion of indigent people cannot. The latter group 
is not willfully failing to comply with a court order, as is required 
for a typical finding of contempt. But in the child support context, 
parents are legally obligated to pay the amount a judge previously 
determined they are capable of affording. Thus, a judge can find 
a child support nonpayer to be both indigent and in willful viola-
tion of an order to pay.324 Still, it is hard to see how a person could 
 
 321 Turner, 564 US at 445. 
 322 Joseph H. Beale Jr, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv L Rev 161, 
162–64 (1908) (“Typical” contempt scenarios include an “actual disturbance made in the 
court itself which interferes with the process of litigation,” “direct insults to the court itself 
in its presence,” and “any interference with persons or property which are in the hands of 
the court.”); Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 Yale L J 83, 85 (1947) 
(defining contempt as generally including acts in “disregard of the authority of the court” 
or against “the integrity of the court”). See also Nature of Criminal Contempt, 25 Harv L 
Rev 375, 375 (1912) (“A refusal to do justice to other parties in equity suits thus came to 
be known as civil contempt, although it is not inherently a contempt of court at all. Con-
fusion has inevitably arisen.”). More research is warranted on the seeming expansion of 
the use of contempt in the twentieth century. 
 323 Turner’s brief makes a similar point to support the argument that counsel is 
needed in order to retain the proceeding’s civil character. Brief for Petitioner, Turner v 
Rogers, No 10-10, *42 (US filed Jan 4, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 49898) 
(“[T]he state court’s reasoning is fatally circular: the court relied on the defendant’s pre-
sumed ability to purge his contempt to justify the absence of an essential procedural safe-
guard at the contempt hearing, the very purpose of which was to determine whether the 
defendant had the ability to purge his contempt.”). 
 324 See Sickler v Sickler, 878 NW2d 549, 561–62 (Neb 2016) (explaining that “[m]ost 
courts do not allow ‘nonpayment contempt’” because of state constitutional bans on im-
prisonment for debt, but child support is excluded from this rule because it is regarded as 
a public duty rather than a private debt). See also Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons 
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be held in civil contempt if he lacks the present means of comply-
ing. (Turner, for instance, was classed as indigent and needed to 
purge arrears of nearly $6,000.325) 
One way forward could be for the Court to recognize proceed-
ings like those in Turner as criminal contempt hearings. Such a 
holding would attach some criminal procedure protections.326 The-
oretically this would be a step in the right direction, heightening 
procedural safeguards to match the nature of the proceeding and 
severity of the sanction. In practice, this move would have unde-
sirable consequences. Either family courts would need to treat all 
child support contempt hearings as criminal in nature, which is 
overinclusive based on the definition of criminal contempt, or else 
they would still face the dilemma of determining obligors’ present 
ability to comply with support orders prior to holding contempt 
hearings. 
Given the unconvincing application of the Court’s contempt 
precedent to child support enforcement, the Court might instead 
look to the test it has developed for distinguishing between civil 
and criminal statutes more generally. Applying this broader  
analysis is appropriate because, unlike most contempt scenarios, 
contempt for child support nonpayment is—in the Court’s own 
words and as supported by this Article—“one part of a highly com-
plex system.”327 It is thus misleading to evaluate the contempt 
proceeding in isolation. 
The Court’s test for distinguishing between civil and criminal 
statutes has been roundly condemned, perhaps most memorably 
as “a jurisprudential Frankenstein’s monster—a patchwork as-
sembled from disparate parts, unwieldy and unpredictable, and 
suffering from a distressing but justified inquietude about its rea-
son for existing.”328 The test consists of two parts. First, the Court 
“must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to es-
tablish ‘civil’ proceedings.” If so, the Court next considers whether 
the scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate 
 
and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 Harv L Rev 1024, 1036 (2016). For assessments of other 
scenarios potentially leading to imprisonment for debt, see generally Lea Shepard, Credi-
tor’s Contempt, 2011 BYU L Rev 1509; Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice 
Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 Md L Rev 486 (2016); Tamar R. Birckhead, The 
New Peonage, 72 Wash & Lee L Rev 1595 (2015); Christopher D. Hampson, The New 
American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 Am J Crim L 1 (2017). 
 325 Turner, 564 US at 437. 
 326 International Union v Bagwell, 512 US 821, 826–27 (1994). 
 327 Turner, 564 US at 443. 
 328 Fellmeth, 94 Georgetown L J at 10 (cited in note 315). 
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legislative intent, and “only the clearest proof will suffice to over-
ride intent and transform what has been denominated a civil rem-
edy into a criminal penalty.”329 For this analysis, the Court has 
provided seven non-exhaustive and non-dispositive “guide-
posts.”330 Even when first outlining the guideposts, the Court rec-
ognized they “may often point in differing directions,” and the 
Court has subsequently applied them selectively and  
inconsistently.331 Thus, it is not clear that the test does more than 
provide a weak patina of standardized analysis.332 
Applying the test to the child support context exposes its de-
ficiencies and demonstrates how it may undermine legal princi-
ples and procedural justice goals.333 The problems in application 
begin from the first step—ascertaining whether the legislature 
meant to establish civil proceedings. Here the Court often relies 
on states’ labels or the placement of laws in civil versus criminal 
codes.334 Such deference permits legislatures to skirt criminal pro-
cedure protections. This concern is not merely hypothetical. As 
this account details, at least some states recast criminal family 
support prosecutions as civil proceedings to reduce expensive and 
time-consuming procedural protections, while retaining criminal-
style enforcement powers.335 The Court’s reliance on state labels 
could also mean that it would perversely allow disparate proce-
dural protections for identical proceedings held in different 
states.336 As a practical matter, the Court should not unquestion-
ingly accept a “civil” categorization on the mistaken assumption 
 
 329 Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 92 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 330 Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168–69 (1963). 
 331 Id at 169. See also, for example, Smith, 538 US at 97 (finding only five factors 
relevant). 
 332 Issachar Rosen-Zvi and Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 Va L 
Rev 79, 126 (2008) (“Although the multifaceted test has been invoked frequently, it has 
likely never determined an outcome, not even in [the original] case itself.”). 
 333 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S Cal L Rev 1313, 1352, 1362–63 
(2012) (identifying “core values served by criminal adjudication . . . legality, evidentiary 
accuracy, and fair process” and discussing procedural justice implications); Collins, 90 
NYU L Rev at 447 (cited in note 21) (discussing criminal law interests in legitimacy and 
fairness). 
 334 See, for example, Smith, 538 US at 92–93. But see Sessions v Dimaya, 138 S Ct 
1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch concurring) (“[T]he happenstance that a law is found in a civil 
or criminal part of the statute books cannot be dispositive.”). 
 335 See Part III. 
 336 See Nowakowski v New York, 835 F3d 210, 220 (2d Cir 2016) (Variances in state 
labels for identical offenses “counsel against adopting a purely labels-dependent approach 
to our analysis. If we were to do otherwise, federal jurisdiction . . . arising from similar or 
identical conduct and punishment would be controlled by vagaries of nomenclature, not 
substance.”). 
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that “civil” law is less harsh.337 The shift to civil can bring net-
widening consequences and attach nearly identical punishments 
devoid of procedural protections.338 
Relying less on state labels places more weight on the second 
part of the test, which scholars have also persuasively critiqued. 
This step uses seven guideposts to assess the characteristics of 
the sanction. Applying these factors to child support incarceration 
illustrates how unhelpful they are for securing predictable and 
consistent results. The first two guideposts can be addressed to-
gether. They are: (1) “Whether the sanction involves an affirma-
tive disability or restraint,” and (2) “whether it has historically 
been regarded as a punishment.”339 Incarceration is an affirma-
tive restraint and a classic, paradigmatic criminal sanction, yet 
the Court has been unwilling to recognize it as such in the con-
tempt context because of the supposedly remedial purpose. 
Guidepost three, “whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter,” fits awkwardly here; the Court included this factor to 
tease out the difference between customs fees and taxes versus 
monetary penalties, with only the latter requiring scienter. 340 
Guideposts four and six can also be taken together: (4) “whether 
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence” and (6) “whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for 
it.”341 Deterrence has long been a key rationale for incarcerating 
nonsupporters, and there have been hints of retribution and crim-
inal-style stigmatization (“deadbeat dads”) as well, yet remedia-
tion is at least theoretically a core goal. Guidepost five is “whether 
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.”342 The Court’s 
application of this factor has never been clear, and it is uncertain 
how it would play out in a situation such as this, when criminal 
laws addressing the same conduct preceded, were interlaced with, 
 
 337 See Parts III.A and IV.B. 
 338 Alexandra Natapoff offers an analogous argument involving the shift from felonies 
to misdemeanors. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization,  
68 Vand L Rev 1055 (2015). 
 339 Kennedy, 372 US at 168. 
 340 Id (citing cases involving taxes and customs fees for this guidepost). 
 341 Id at 168–69. 
 342 Id at 168. 
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and followed civil support statutes.343 Finally, the seventh guide-
post, “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned,” is debatable.344 
Thus, while there are solid arguments that the Court should 
and perhaps would classify child support incarceration as a crim-
inal sanction—especially based on the research presented in this 
Article—the seven factors do not guarantee that result.345 That 
the test might not recognize nonsupport incarceration as a crimi-
nal sanction effectively endorses legislatures’ ability to relabel 
their criminal laws as civil, a strategy they could (and arguably 
do) employ in countless contexts.346 
While a comprehensive reassessment of the guideposts is be-
yond the scope of this Article, it is worth drawing from child sup-
port history to identify a critical aspect of statutory schemes that 
these factors omit: the machinery that secures and imposes the 
sanction.347 Criminal procedure protections were enacted to pro-
tect individuals from the powers of the state.348 The involvement 
of government officials from start to finish in child support en-
forcement, in combination with the admitted public interests at 
stake, distinguishes this statutory scheme from other types of so-
called civil contempt incarceration. In the words of the Turner 
majority: “The Federal Government has created an elaborate pro-
cedural mechanism designed to help both the government and the 
 
 343 For an example of how this factor can cut both ways, see United States v Ward, 
448 US 242, 250 (1980) (When a civil statute applied to the “precise conduct” criminalized 
in an earlier statute, the fifth guidepost pointed to finding the civil statute “criminal in 
nature . . . at first blush.” However, “we believe that the placement of criminal penalties 
in one statute and the placement of civil penalties in another statute enacted 70 years 
later tends to dilute the force of the fifth . . . criterion in this case.”). 
 344 Kennedy, 372 US at 168. 
 345 In Smith, the majority opinion suggests: “A historical survey can be useful because 
a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a means deemed punitive in 
our tradition, so that the public will recognize it as such.” Smith, 538 US at 97. 
 346 Fellmeth, 94 Georgetown L J at 5–6 (cited in note 315) (listing examples). Alan 
Dershowitz describes a “labeling game” from the late 1930s. After the Michigan Supreme 
Court struck down a criminal-style law that permitted confinement of certain sex offend-
ers without full criminal procedure safeguards, the state legislature essentially passed the 
law again in a different part of the state code and made various changes that facilitated 
commitment. The Court upheld this new “civil” law, which “provided far fewer safeguards 
and far harsher consequences.” Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested 
Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 Tex L Rev 1277, 1300–01 (1973). 
 347 Compare with Brooke D. Coleman, Prison Is Prison, 88 Notre Dame L Rev 2399, 
2437–38 (2013) (emphasizing “the degree of government power” as relevant to procedural 
protections but stopping short of recasting child support as criminal). 
 348 Klein, 2 Buff Crim L Rev at 691 (cited in note 30). 
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custodial parents to secure payments to which they are enti-
tled.”349 Especially when the sanction at issue is incarceration, it 
should be highly relevant whether government officials are liter-
ally or effectively the opposing party.350 
C. Potential Consequences of the Criminal Label for Child 
Support Enforcement 
If the Court were persuaded to identify modern child support 
enforcement methods as criminal, that holding would not provide 
a straightforward solution. Rather, lawmakers would then need 
to decide whether to attach constitutionally mandated criminal 
procedure protections or change their statutory scheme to decrim-
inalize child support enforcement. How state legislators could de-
criminalize child support enforcement would depend on the de-
tails of the Court’s decision, but certainly the elimination of 
incarceration could be a major factor in crafting a “civil” regime. 
Prosecutors could then still rely on the criminal-labeled laws all 
states retain to pursue incarceration of the worst offenders; in 
these proceedings, criminal procedure protections would attach. 
Though it is hard to predict which path lawmakers might 
choose, there is at least some reason to be optimistic that the costs 
of additional procedures would lead to decriminalization.351 The 
clearest evidence may be that states already have criminal (typi-
cally misdemeanor) laws on the books for nonsupport and yet 
 
 349 Turner, 564 US at 444 (emphasis added). 
 350 Because incarceration is such a severe and paradigmatic sanction, some discus-
sants have proposed that a better approach is for incarceration itself to be the litmus test 
for the provision of state-appointed counsel. Coleman, 88 Notre Dame L Rev at 2455 (cited 
in note 347); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, 
Turner v Rogers, No 10-10, *6 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 
108379). Similarly, a number of state supreme court cases anticipated that Turner would 
come out to the contrary because of the incarceration component alone. For example, Mead 
v Batchlor, 460 NW2d 493 (Mich 1990) (identifying incarceration as most relevant factor 
in right to counsel and holding that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded incarceration 
for child support nonpayment by indigent lacking public defender). For a related argu-
ment, see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal 
and Civil Law, 101 Yale L J 1795, 1870 (1992) (suggesting procedure should turn on the 
severity of the sanction). But see Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 
125 Yale L J 2446, 2492–96 (2016) (arguing against conflation of punitive/nonpunitive 
with criminal/civil but also recognizing prison terms as “inherently criminal”).  
 351 Compare with Natapoff, 68 Vand L Rev at 1101 (cited in note 338) (describing how 
resource constraints attach in the criminal context). But see Birckhead, 72 Wash & Lee L 
Rev at 1653 (cited in note 324) (“[S]tates rarely examine the fiscal and personnel costs 
incurred by courts and municipalities to administer collection mechanisms that fail to ex-
empt the indigent.”). 
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rarely use them, presumably in large part because of the added 
costs and difficulties associated with criminal law and because 
prosecutors prioritize other types of cases.352 Whereas states can 
anticipate recouping or even profiting from “user fees” for public 
defenders and jail stays after prosecuting other low-level 
crimes, 353  in the child support context, the profit incentive is  
undermined by the fact that these offenders already owe large 
debts, including to the state.354 
On the other hand, because of the complexities of federal-
state cost and benefit sharing in support enforcement, as well as 
fractured interests at the local level, it is possible that decision-
makers would not holistically evaluate the efficiency of the statu-
tory scheme.355 Since the federal-state partnership began in the 
1970s, there have been lengthy periods in which pursuit of public-
benefits reimbursements from fathers resulted in a net loss, even 
as some (but not all) states enjoyed a net gain.356 Another cost dis-
juncture may be present specifically for incarceration. Even if in-
carceration costs more than it prompts parents to pay, the rele-
vant decision-makers may not bear these expenses or be fully 
 
 352 See generally Cook and Noyes, The Use of Civil Contempt and Criminal Nonsup-
port as Child Enforcement Tools (cited in note 311). See also Ronald R. Tweel, Elizabeth 
P. Coughter, and Jason P. Seiden, Family Law, 46 U Richmond L Rev 145, 165 (2011) 
(observing that Virginia’s criminal nonsupport statute was “almost abandoned by most 
courts and litigants” because of “criminal burden of proof problems”). On the other hand, 
state legislatures could revise criminal statutes to make convictions easier, such as by 
converting the offenses to strict liability. For discussion of statutory changes along these 
lines, see State v Meacham, 470 SW3d 744 (Mo 2015) (en banc) (construing statutory 
amendment that converted element “without good cause” into an affirmative defense); 
People v Likine, 823 NW2d 50 (Mich 2012) (construing revised statute containing “no fault 
or intent element”); State v Clark, 24 So2d 72 (La 1945) (construing revised statute that 
deleted “without just cause”). 
 353 Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 Duke L J 1381, 1404–05, 1423–
25 (2018); Wayne A. Logan and Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice,  
2014 U Ill L Rev 1175. 
 354 See Part IV.A. 
 355 Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 668 (cited in note 14) (child support incarcera-
tion costs “are partly externalized” by child support agencies because they are born by 
states’ judicial and criminal justice systems); Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and 
the Real Costs of Policing, 90 NYU L Rev 870 (2015) (exploring how federal programs can 
skew the financial incentives of local actors in harmful ways). 
 356 These calculations do not take account of the more successful use of the same ma-
chinery for families not receiving welfare. Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1072–73 
(cited in note 29). 
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aware of them.357 An unknown consideration is what value legis-
latures place on vindicating the state’s authority and inculcating 
norms about appropriate fatherly behavior. 
There is a real risk that if the Court held the current child 
support enforcement approach to be criminal, some states would 
not move to decriminalize it. In that scenario, child support debt-
ors could be left in a worse position. Those found guilty would face 
the stigma, reduced employment prospects, and other collateral 
consequences of a criminal record, without necessarily gaining 
meaningful procedural protections. 358  While fully recognizing 
these harmful consequences, it is worth recalling the downsides 
to the current legal scheme as well as the broader principles at 
stake. Recognizing the ongoing criminal character of child sup-
port enforcement forces an honest reckoning with the operation 
of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is no longer possible to remain under the delusion that 
modern child support enforcement is “civil” in a meaningful 
sense. For more than one hundred years, policymakers have care-
fully fashioned family support laws, and the courts that enforce 
them, to maximize compliance with minimal cost and procedure. 
In this process, they knitted strands of civil and criminal law into 
an intricate tapestry. Whereas the early twentieth century 
dressed up what had been civil family support suits with the ar-
mor of criminal law, twenty-first-century child support wears civil 
garb that conceals criminal layers and seams in plain sight. This 
intricate interlacing is due for unraveling so that a more fair and 
effective system can be designed. 
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tections and impose harmful collateral consequences and costs. See especially Natapoff, 
85 S Cal L Rev at 1313 (cited in note 333); Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 Iowa L 
Rev 1929, 1929–30 (2014); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 
BU L Rev 953 (2018). 
